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Introduction
Immigration law is most well-known among law professors for its
marked departure from mainstream U.S. constitutional law. First invoked
125 years ago to shield the “Chinese exclusion laws” 1 from judicial review,
the plenary power doctrine in effect immunizes the substantive immigration
judgments of Congress about which noncitizens to admit into, and deport
from, the United States. Through the application of the doctrine, courts
1. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581 (1889). For cogent criticism of The Chinese Exclusion Case, see Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
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have allowed the U.S. immigration laws to discriminate against noncitizens
in ways that would be patently unconstitutional if the rights of U.S. citizens
were at stake. 2
Slowly chipping away at the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court
has increasingly protected the procedural due process rights of noncitizens
facing removal from the country. 3 Nevertheless, the core of the doctrine
continues to protect the substantive immigration judgments of Congress
from judicial review. 4 The doctrine’s deviation from fundamental
conceptions of constitutional review epitomizes what immigration law
professors have characterized as “immigration exceptionalism.” 5
Commentators long have criticized the plenary power doctrine as being
out of step with the revolution in constitutional law that took place over the
twentieth century. 6 Nonetheless, despite acting at various times to avoid the
2. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION
CIVIL RIGHTS (2003) (analyzing the history of discrimination against people of color,
women, political minorities, and other disfavored groups in the U.S. immigration laws).
3. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1984) (analyzing the evolution of immigration law and showing its movement
toward increasing constitutional protections for noncitizens). A well-known example of a
modern decision of this variety is Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22 (1982), in which the
Supreme Court held that a lawful permanent resident who departed the United States for a
brief period was entitled to a hearing comporting with Due Process before she could be
denied return into the country.
4. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).
5. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392-94 (1999); Rachel E.
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1965, 1981-89 (2013). Besides immunizing the substantive immigration judgments of
Congress from judicial review, immigration exceptionalism also afflicts the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions permitting the consideration of race in the
enforcement of the immigration laws. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris,
Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); Alfredo Mirandé, Is
There a “Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?, 55 FLA. L. REV 365 (2003). The
development of that form of immigration exceptionalism, its racially disparate impacts on
communities of color, and similar developments in the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions
are analyzed in Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).
6. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996);
Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.

AND
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doctrine’s harsh impacts,7 the Supreme Court to this point has failed to
eliminate, or substantially limit, the doctrine. Consequently, lower courts
occasionally invoke the plenary power doctrine to justify deference to
Congress and the executive branch in immigration matters. 8
Around the turn of the century, immigration scholars opined that the
Court was on the verge of abrogating, or otherwise limiting, the plenary
power doctrine. 9 The events of September 11, 2001, however, abruptly
ended talk of the doctrine’s demise. Indeed, when promulgating a
regulation creating a program that required certain Arab and Muslim
noncitizens to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
REV. 701 (2005); Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425 (1997); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden
Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965.
7. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36-37 (1982) (holding that lawful
permanent resident seeking to return to the United States after a brief departure from the
country was entitled to a hearing consistent with due process); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S.
449, 462 (1963) (interpreting the U.S. immigration laws to avoid the question of the
constitutionality of the prohibition or the admission of homosexuals). See generally Joseph
Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV.
879 (2015) (contending that Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence has produced a
body of law weakening immigration and national security exceptionalism); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (analyzing reliance by the
Supreme Court in immigration cases on procedural due process norms as “surrogates” for
substantive constitutional protections to avoid harsh results); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (offering examples of the Court
employing “phantom norms” in interpreting the immigration laws in order to avoid the
application of the plenary power doctrine). For a capsule summary of “cracks” in the plenary
power doctrine in the Supreme Court’s decisions, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 164-66 (5th ed. 2009).
8. See, e.g., Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and
superseded by 788 F.3d 893 (2015); Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2011); Johnson
v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d
939, 941 (8th Cir. 2010).
9. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny
of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright,
1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). For skepticism about the claim that the end of the plenary power
doctrine was imminent, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement:
A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000).
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then-Attorney General John Ashcroft expressly invoked the plenary power
doctrine to protect the facially discriminatory measure from the inevitable
constitutional challenges; he emphasized matter-of-factly that “[t]he
political branches of the government have plenary authority in the
immigration area. In the context of immigration and nationality laws, the
Supreme Court has particularly ‘underscore[d] the limited scope of judicial
inquiry.’” 10 Accepting the Attorney General’s assertions, courts rejected
various constitutional challenges to the special registration program. 11
Security fears expanded beyond the events of September 11, 2001, and
ultimately translated into calls for greater enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico
border. 12 The focus on public safety also appeared, at least temporarily, to
subtly influence the Supreme Court’s approach to various immigration
measures, including the detention of immigrants convicted of crimes. 13 As
worries about terrorism in the United States have receded with the passage
of time since September 11, the aggressive push for extraordinary
immigration enforcement measures has generally diminished.
This Article posits that the trend in the Supreme Court’s contemporary
immigration decisions suggests that the plenary power doctrine—the
bedrock of immigration exceptionalism—is once again heading toward its
ultimate demise. To test that thesis, the Article scrutinizes the Court’s
immigration decisions, as well as some other actions, such as certiorari
10. Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52584, 52585
(Aug. 12, 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 702 (1977); Matthews
v. Diaz, 476 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1976)). Special registration was one of a number of muchcriticized security measures directed at Arab and Muslim noncitizens after September 11.
See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) (analyzing such measures); Susan M. Akram
& Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001:
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (to the same
effect); Leti Volpp, The Citizens and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (same).
11. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales,
447 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006).
12. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security
After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369,
1387 (2007).
13. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional
Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343-45 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005)
(contending that the Supreme Court’s decision upholding mandatory detention of
noncitizens convicted of certain crimes in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), was
influenced by national security fears following September 11, 2001 and explained the
decision’s departure from Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679 (2001), which was decided
shortly before September 11).
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denials in significant immigration cases, from the 2009 to the 2013 Terms.
This period coincides with the first five years of the Obama presidency,
during which time the executive branch has infrequently relied on the
plenary power doctrine as a justification for its immigration positions. 14
The Supreme Court’s decisions reveal that, although it now reviews
considerably fewer cases than it once did,15 immigration matters regularly
comprise a bread-and-butter part of its docket. Indeed, the Court decided
five immigration-related merits cases in the 2011 Term, which represents a
large number for a specialty area of the law.16 Such a steady diet of
immigration cases is consistent with the observation that it is an important
national issue worthy of attention, and that the cases raise questions that go
to the core of the modern administrative state. Considerable controversy has
surrounded some of the immigration cases that have come before the
Court, 17 especially the much-publicized constitutional challenge to
Arizona’s landmark immigration law known as SB 1070 and many other
state and local efforts to push the federal government toward more vigorous
enforcement of the immigration laws. 18 What perhaps stands out most from
the review of the five Terms is that a conservative Supreme Court,
characterized by some observers as ideologically extreme, 19 has
consistently followed generally applicable legal principles in its
immigration decisions. The Roberts Court’s immigration decisions indeed
fit comfortably within the jurisprudential mainstream of its decisions in
other substantive areas of law. 20 The Court consistently has applied
ordinary, standard, and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard,
and unremarkable ways.

14. See infra Part VI (analyzing trends in Supreme Court’s immigration decisions and
arguments made by the executive branch to the Court).
15. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and
Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368-69
(2006).
16. See infra Part III (analyzing decisions from the 2011 Term).
17. See infra Parts I-V.
18. See infra Parts III.A, IV.C, V.B. (discussing Supreme Court’s approaches in federal
preemption cases).
19. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the
Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 218 (2011).
20. See infra Parts I-V.
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In addition, the Court has declined to stretch its ordinary rules to review
immigration cases with decidedly political overtones,21 such as the growing
number of cases evaluating the constitutionality of state and local
immigration enforcement laws. Rather, in selecting immigration cases for
review, the Court has adhered to its standard practice of resolving circuit
splits and considering legal questions of national importance.22 It has
denied certiorari and refused to review a number of cases involving
politically charged state and local immigration measures. 23 For now, the
Court has allowed its two recent decisions on federal preemption of such
laws to be applied by the lower courts.
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has decided several
cases dealing with the U.S. government’s efforts to remove from the
country lawful permanent residents convicted of crimes. 24 That
development reflects Congress’s steady expansion of the criminal grounds
for the removal of noncitizens combined with the dramatic increase in the
U.S. government’s efforts at directing immigration enforcement at criminal
noncitizens. 25
In response to the growing number of states attempting to “assist” in the
enforcement of the federal immigration laws, the Court has shown keen
interest in the constitutional distribution of power between the state and
national governments. 26 In consecutive Terms, the Court decided a pair of
federal preemption cases squarely raising the constitutionality of
immigration enforcement laws arising out of Arizona—ground zero in the
heated national debate over immigration. Workmanlike in approach, the
decisions clarified the relative spheres of federal versus state power with
respect to modern immigration enforcement and reined in Arizona’s novel
efforts (and, through its decision, similar moves by other state and local

21. See infra Parts II.C.1., IV.C., V.B.
22. See, e.g., infra note 88 (noting that Court granted certiorari in Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder to resolve a circuit split).
23. See infra text Parts IV.C, V.B and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., infra Parts I.B. (discussing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563
(2010)); IV.A (analyzing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013)).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
26. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-09 (2012)
(upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate component of the Affordable Care
Act and rejecting challenges from several states); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (addressing federalism issues in holding that the Second Amendment applies to the
states).
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governments) to encroach upon the federal immigration enforcement
power. 27
Analyzing the body of immigration decisions of the Supreme Court in
the 2009-13 Terms, this Article concludes that the Court has, to a large
extent, continued to bring U.S. immigration law into the jurisprudential
mainstream. Consistent with its efforts over more than a decade to avoid
deciding serious constitutional questions, 28 the Court has interpreted the
immigration laws in ways that allow it to bypass such questions and to not
invoke the plenary power doctrine to shield constitutionally dubious
statutes from judicial review. 29 Thus, without eliminating the doctrine, the
Court has silently moved away from anything that might be characterized
as immigration exceptionalism.
In applying U.S. immigration laws, both conservative and liberal
Supreme Court Justices look first to the text of the comprehensive federal
immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 30 and
spend considerable time debating the proper interpretation of the often
complex statutory provisions. The Justices frequently differ about the
application of conventional legal doctrines to immigration cases, but rarely
raise the considerably more controversial question whether conventional
doctrines should apply at all to these cases.
As those knowledgeable of contemporary developments in
administrative law would suspect, the deference properly afforded the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a common battleground for
advocates in the Supreme Court. The arguments on this important question
27. See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
28. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (acknowledging the “strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” that requires “a clear
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction” of a removal order); McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding that, because Congress had not
made a clear statement barring judicial review of class action, the Court would in a class
action decide the lawfulness of the implementation of a program in the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986). Several other recent Supreme Court decisions have ensured
judicial review of removal orders in the face of apparent congressional attempts to restrict, if
not eliminate, judicial review. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003);
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). This pattern of constitutional avoidance in
ensuring judicial review of immigration matters can be understood as an effort by the Court
to avoid invoking the plenary power doctrine. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance
in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008) (making similar observation in
connection with litigation over the rights of enemy combatants).
29. See supra note 28 (citing authority).
30. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as
amended).
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are central to modern administrative law, in which there is much debate
over the proper degree of deference due administrative agencies. As in
many substantive areas of law, the issue results in differences of opinion
among the Justices in immigration cases. 31 Arguments about agency
deference are related to arguments about statutory interpretation because,
under well-established administrative law doctrine, the Court frequently
defers to what it determines to be reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. It was rare for any Justice—much less a majority of the
Court—to advocate for the kind of extreme deference embodied by the
plenary power doctrine. 32
In applying conventional methods to immigration cases, the Court has on
a regular basis—although not always—rejected the U.S. government’s
positions. It therefore is difficult to convincingly contend that the Court
consistently extends extreme, undue, or exceptional deference to the
government’s immigration decision-making. Some commentators might
even contend that the Court in some cases is less deferential to the agencies
administering the immigration laws than what arguably is called for by
general administrative law principles. 33
As we shall see, a Supreme Court on the conservative side of the
ideological spectrum has consistently taken a lawyerly—some might say
judicious—case-by-case approach to the judicial review of immigration
decisions. It applies generally applicable legal doctrines in its review. 34
That development is unquestionably disappointing to advocates of an
immigration jurisprudence more protective of immigrants.35 However, the
trend in the Court’s decisions reflects what can be positively viewed as
bringing immigration law more in line with conventional norms of judicial
review. If the trend continues, the Court may ultimately relegate
immigration exceptionalism, and the plenary power doctrine itself, to the
history books, merely an artifact primarily of interest to legal historians. 36
This Article predicts that unduly deferential approaches will likely not
return with regularity in the foreseeable future. Such approaches, however,

31. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.
32. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s scathing
dissent in part in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).
33. See infra Part III.B. (analyzing Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
476 (2011)).
34. See infra Part VI.A.
35. See infra Part VI.B.
36. See infra Part VI (summarizing the general trends in the Roberts Court’s
immigration jurisprudence).
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conceivably could return in truly exceptional cases, such as ones
implicating an imminent mass migration37 or following another catastrophic
act of terrorism.
I. The 2009 Term
In the 2009 Term, the Supreme Court extended a fundamental
constitutional protection to noncitizens that has affected the vast majority of
criminal prosecutions of noncitizens in the United States. 38 The Court also
decided two more ordinary immigration cases. 39 Noncitizens prevailed in
all three.
A. Padilla v. Kentucky: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on
Immigration Advice
Addressing an issue that had been percolating in the lower federal and
state courts, 40 the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky held that a lawful
permanent resident could base a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on an attorney’s alleged failure to accurately inform the
defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction—namely, possible removal from the United States.41

37. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (rejecting legal
challenges to U.S. government program in which the Coast Guard interdicted large numbers
of Haitian migrants on the high seas before they could reach the shores of the United States
and apply for relief from removal). For a time, the publicity over the “surge” of
unaccompanied minors coming to the United States from Central America in 2014
threatened to influence the Supreme Court’s approach to immigration matters. See Frances
Robles, Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2014, at A1.
The number of Central Americans coming to this country has diminished, however, along
with the sense of urgency to respond. See Michael Muskal, Border Crossings by Children
Decline as Immigration Debate Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/ la-na-immigration-numbers-2014114-story.html.
38. See Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions
Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1 (2011), available at http://
www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/does-the-crime-fit-the-punishment
-recent-judicial-actions-expan.pdf (analyzing Padilla v. Kentucky and Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, two immigration decisions from the 2009 Term) (last visited June 30, 2015).
39. See infra Parts I.B., C.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.
2002), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Utah v. Rojas-Martinez, 125
P.3d 930 (Utah 2005), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
41. 559 U.S. 356, 374-75 (2010).
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After pleading guilty to drug trafficking charges in Kentucky state court,
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident for more
than forty years with U.S. citizen children, faced removal from the
country. 42 He claimed that his criminal defense counsel failed to advise him
of the likely deportation resulting from a drug conviction before he entered
a guilty plea; Padilla in fact alleged that his counsel had affirmatively told
him not to worry about removal, because he had lived in this country for so
many years. 43 Padilla contended that, had he been properly informed of the
likelihood of removal resulting from the plea bargain, he would have taken
his chances at trial. 44
Rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed Padilla’s criminal conviction. 45 It reasoned that,
because deportation is a civil matter and a mere “collateral” consequence of
a criminal conviction, the Sixth Amendment does not protect criminal
defendants from erroneous advice about the possible immigration
consequences of a conviction. 46
In one of his last opinions before retirement, Justice Stevens wrote for a
majority of the Court. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires
counsel to inform a noncitizen client that a plea carries the risk of
deportation; consequently, Padilla had sufficiently alleged that his counsel’s
representation was constitutionally deficient. 47 In reaching that conclusion,
the Court recognized that removal from the country is now virtually
inevitable for many noncitizens convicted of crimes. 48 Therefore, the
receipt of accurate legal advice is more important than ever for noncitizens
deciding whether to accept a plea deal. 49 For many noncitizens, deportation
is one of the most important parts of the total penalty that may flow from a
criminal conviction. 50
42. Id. at 359.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
46. See id. at 485. In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General filed a brief in support of
affirmance of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08651), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_
preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_651_AffirmanceAmCuUSA.authcheckdam.pdf.
47. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-74.
48. Id. at 360.
49. Id. at 364.
50. Id.
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The Court previously had held that the Sixth Amendment entitles a
criminal defendant to “the effective assistance of competent counsel,”
before he or she decides whether to plead guilty. 51 In evaluating the merits
of Padilla’s claim, the Court applied the generally applicable test for
ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in its 1984 decision of Strickland
v. Washington. 52
Disagreeing with the Kentucky Supreme Court, the majority emphasized
that, in deciding the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel, it
had never previously distinguished between “direct” and “collateral”
consequences. 53 The Court observed that, although removal proceedings are
classified as civil matters, removal based on a criminal conviction is deeply
intertwined with the modern criminal justice process. It thus is
extraordinarily difficult to classify it as either a “direct” or “collateral”
consequence of a criminal conviction.54 The Court further acknowledged
that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that
[criminal defense] counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation.” 55
The Court ultimately concluded that advice about possible removal from
the United States is within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. 56 Finding that Padilla had sufficiently
alleged a constitutional violation, the Court remanded the case to the
Kentucky courts for further proceedings to determine whether he had
suffered the prejudice necessary to prevail under Strickland. 57
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the
judgment. 58 He agreed with the majority that Padilla had established a

51. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
52. See id. at 366 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
53. Id. at 365.
54. Id. at 365-66.
55. Id. at 367 (citing, inter alia, Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 71318 (2002)).
56. Id. at 374.
57. Id. at 369; see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693,
695 (2011) (analyzing proof of prejudice required to prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky). On remand, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky found that violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel prejudiced Padilla and vacated the conviction. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d
322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
58. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375 (Alito, J., concurring).
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prima facie case of violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel. 59
Justice Alito, however, understood the right to be narrower than the
majority did. 60 In his view, the right to effective assistance of counsel
should only protect criminal defendants from defense counsel who
affirmatively provide them with incorrect legal advice on immigration
matters (as Padilla alleged). 61 For Justice Alito, the right would ordinarily
be limited to requiring counsel to advise the noncitizen defendant of the
possible need to consult an immigration attorney about the adverse
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.62
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. 63 The dissent
emphatically disagreed with the majority that the effective assistance of
counsel obligation under the Sixth Amendment extended to what he insisted
were merely “collateral” civil consequences, including the possible
immigration consequences, of a criminal conviction.64
All of the justices on the Court decided Padilla’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment through the application of
generally applicable precedent, even though the case involved a noncitizen
defendant. In so doing, the majority brought removal-related advice under
the purview of the general right to effective assistance of counsel.
Padilla v. Kentucky is one of the most significant decisions affecting the
rights of immigrants in the United States in decades. 65 Although only
decided in 2010, the decision has already generated a voluminous body of
scholarly commentary. 66 The far-reaching practical impacts of the decision
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 384-88.
63. Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 389-90.
65. See infra note 66 (citing authorities).
66. See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of
Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating
the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV.
1117, 1118 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical
Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21; César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Criminal Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 476
(2012); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty
for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 847 (2013); Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the
Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses Fundamental Fairness and Leaves
Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 32 (2012); Daniel
Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging
Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2011);
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in no small part result from the U.S. government’s increasingly aggressive
efforts to deport “criminal aliens.”67 Virtually every noncitizen plea
agreement—a central part of the contemporary criminal justice system 68—
Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553, 563-71 (2013); Anita
Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on
Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across the Border?, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 327, 328 (2011); Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v.
Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353,
354 (2011); Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants
Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 169, 170 (2011); Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal
Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2011); Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v.
Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful
Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012); Joanna Rosenberg, Note, A Game Changer?
The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the Collateral Consequences Rule and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2013); see also Christopher
N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and
Criminal Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132 (2014) (stating that Padilla recognized
“the right to effective crimmigration counsel–the right to effective advice concerning the
potential immigration consequences of a criminal conviction”) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, ET AL., COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013)
(summarizing law concerning collateral consequences of criminal convictions).
67. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV.
75 (2013); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Allegra M.
McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 367 (2006); Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing
Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 494-512 (2011); Yolanda
Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639
(2011).
68. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
(2012):
The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of
the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea
bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process
at critical stages. Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial
as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines
who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not
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has immigration consequences and, as such, is subject to the mandate of the
Court’s ruling.
B. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder: Removal for Misdemeanor Drug
Possession 69
The immigration statute makes lawful permanent residents convicted of
an “aggravated felony” 70 ineligible for a form of relief from removal known
as “cancellation of removal.” 71 Such relief, if granted, permits the
noncitizen to lawfully remain in the United States. Over the last several
decades, Congress has progressively expanded the definition of an
aggravated felony and thus subjected growing numbers of immigrants
convicted of crimes to mandatory detention and removal. 72 The trend
reflects the political unpopularity in Congress of noncitizens convicted of
crimes, as well as the consistent popularity of tough enforcement measures
directed at immigrants.73
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
69. A preview of the issues raised by this case can be found in Kevin R. Johnson &
Raha Jorjani, Only in Immigration Law and in Alice in Wonderland: Aggravated
Misdemeanors?, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.
acslaw.org/acsblog/node/15775.
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
71. See id. § 1229b(a)(3).
72. As one commentator summarized the evolution of the definition of an “aggravated
felony,”
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal category in 1988,
only three serious crimes were included: murder, drug trafficking, and firearms
trafficking. The current list—now at twenty-eight offenses, some of which
create further sub-categories—includes crimes that are neither aggravated nor
felonies under criminal law. Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year
sentence can qualify as an aggravated felony, as does a year of probation with a
suspended sentence for pulling hair—a misdemeanor under Georgia law.
Convictions for selling ten dollars worth of marijuana, theft of a ten-dollar
video game, shoplifting fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and forging a
check for less than twenty dollars have all been held to be aggravated felonies.
Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory detention, deportation without the
possibility of almost all forms of discretionary relief, including asylum and
cancellation of removal, and a permanent bar on lawful reentry.
Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-59 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
73. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1531-34 (1995);
see, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003) (describing congressional findings of
high level of criminal activity among noncitizens); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 713

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

72

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:57

With congressional expansion of the criminal grounds for removal,
combined with the executive branch’s increased removal efforts directed at
noncitizens convicted of crimes, 74 the U.S. government now removes from
the country approximately 400,000 immigrants each year.75 Many are
lawful permanent residents convicted of relatively minor criminal
offenses. 76 As one commentator has aptly observed, “[t]he deportation of
‘criminal aliens’ is now the driving force in American immigration
enforcement. . . . In effect, federal immigration enforcement has become a
criminal removal system.” 77
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 78 the Court held that CarachuriRosendo’s second minor drug possession offense did not constitute an
aggravated felony and therefore could not serve as grounds for automatic
removal of a lawful permanent resident. It specifically addressed the
question whether a state misdemeanor conviction for drug possession may
amount to an aggravated felony under the U.S. immigration laws. 79 A
lawful permanent resident with four U.S. citizen children, Jose Angel
Carachuri-Rosendo immigrated to the United States from Mexico in 1993. 80
He subsequently was convicted for (1) misdemeanor possession of
marijuana, for which he received a twenty-day jail sentence, and (2)
misdemeanor possession of one tablet of a prescription drug (Xanax), for

(2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing data showing high rates of recidivism among
noncitizen criminals).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
75. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 1 (2014), available at https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf.
76. See Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the
Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents,
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 865 (1998); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the
1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1936, 1942 (2000).
77. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
78. 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010).
79. Id. A difference of opinion exists on the question whether the courts should defer to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretation of “aggravated felony,” in light of
the fact that the Board’s expertise is in immigration, not criminal, law. See Michael
Dorfman-Gonzalez, Note, Chevron’s Flexible Agency Expertise Model: Applying the
Chevron Doctrine to the BIA’s Interpretation of the INA’s Criminal Law—Based
Aggravated Felony Provision, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 976-77 (2013).
80. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S at 570.
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which he received a ten-day sentence. 81 His two relatively minor drug
possession convictions suggest that Carachuri-Rosendo was little more than
a small-time drug offender.
Federal law provides that, when a person is convicted of possessing a
controlled substance after a previous drug conviction, the prosecutor may
seek what is known as a “recidivist enhancement,” which converts the
second misdemeanor into a felony conviction.82 To secure such an
enhancement, the prosecutor must comply with a number of procedural
safeguards designed to protect the defendant.83
The prosecutor failed to pursue a recidivist enhancement in CarachuriRosendo’s second drug possession prosecution. 84 Nonetheless, the
immigration court reasoned that, because Carachuri-Rosendo could have
been prosecuted for a felony, he effectively had been convicted of an
aggravated felony and, thus, was not eligible for cancellation of removal. 85
The BIA agreed. 86 The court of appeals denied Carachuri-Rosendo’s
petition for review of the removal order.87 To resolve a conflict among the
circuits, 88 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In another opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that CarachuriRosendo’s second minor drug possession offense did not constitute an
aggravated felony and, thus, could not serve as grounds for automatic
removal. 89 The Court found that, unless the second conviction is in fact
based on a prior conviction (and the recidivist enhancement procedure
followed), a misdemeanor drug possession offense cannot constitute an
aggravated felony. 90
The Court reasoned that the U.S. government’s position ignored the plain
language of the INA, which only prohibits the award of cancellation of
removal when a noncitizen “has . . . been convicted of a[n] aggravated
81. Id. at 570-71.
82. See id. at 568 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2006)).
83. Id. at 567-69.
84. See id. at 563.
85. See In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 394 (BIA 2007).
86. See id. at 390-94.
87. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 560
U.S. 563 (2010).
88. Compare id. (holding that state conviction for simple drug possession after prior
conviction for simple possession is a felony under the Controlled Substances Act and
therefore an aggravated felony under the immigration laws), with Alsol v. Mukasey, 548
F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2008) (reaching a contrary conclusion).
89. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 581-82.
90. See id. at 582.
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felony.” 91 The Court further observed that one does not ordinarily think of a
ten-day sentence for unauthorized possession of a single prescription pill as
an aggravated felony. 92 Citing 2004 precedent, the Court noted that courts
should construe any ambiguities in criminal statutes cross-referenced in the
immigration laws in favor of the noncitizen, a variation of the time-honored
rule of lenity historically applied to the interpretation of penal laws.93
Justices Scalia 94 and Thomas 95 each separately concurred in the
judgment. Both Justices agreed with the holding of the majority. Each,
however, would have reached the conclusion through slightly different
analyses of the statutory text and relevant precedent. 96
In sum, the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder engaged in
unremarkable statutory interpretation of the immigration laws and rejected
the U.S. government’s reading of the statute.97 A majority of the Court
relied on a variant of the rule of lenity to interpret statutory ambiguities in
favor of Carachuri-Rosendo and to find him eligible for relief from
removal. 98 The Justices unanimously agreed on the ultimate disposition of
the case.
Following standard practice, 99 the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgments, and remanded for further consideration eighteen
cases raising similar issues in light of its decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder. 100 The relatively large number of cases subject to the Court’s ruling
is a by-product of the Obama administration’s concentrated efforts to
remove noncitizens with criminal convictions. 101
91. Id. at 576 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006)) (alteration in original).
92. See id. at 564.
93. See id. at 581 (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)).
94. Id. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (citing concurring opinions).
97. For analysis of the Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, see Asher
Steinberg, Supreme Court Holds That a Finding of Recidivism Must Be Made in Court of
Conviction for Repeat Offenses to Qualify as Recidivist Offenses When Ruling on
Applications for Cancellations of Removal, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 539 (2011); Inna
Zazulevskaya, Comment, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder: To Be Deemed Convicted of an
Aggravated Felony, an Actual Conviction Is Required, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1215 (2011).
98. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 576-80.
99. See Sena Ku, Comment, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: Drawing a Line
Between Deference and Control, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 383 (2008) (reviewing Court’s grants of
certiorari, vacation of judgments, and remands).
100. See Supreme Court Grants Cert, Vacates Judgments in Eighteen Cases in Light of
Carachuri-Rosendo, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1287 (June 28, 2010).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
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C. Kucana v. Holder: Judicial Review of Motions to Reopen
Having overslept, Agron Kucana, who entered the country on a business
visa but stayed after it expired, missed his removal hearing in the
immigration court; at that hearing, he would have had the opportunity to
produce evidence in support of asylum and withholding-of-removal claims
based on his alleged fear of persecution if he were returned to his native
country of Albania. 102 The immigration court in absentia ordered Kucana
removed from the United States. 103 As authorized by regulation, 104 he filed
a motion to reopen the proceedings to seek relief from removal. 105 The
immigration court and Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion.106
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Chief Judge Easterbrook, dismissed the petition for review of the denial of
the motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction; the court based the dismissal
on 1996 amendments to the immigration laws that greatly limited judicial
review of the discretionary judgments of the Attorney General.107 Judge
Cudahy dissented, asserting that the majority opinion “giv[es] the executive
branch the authority to insulate its decisions from judicial review where
there is no clear indication in the statute that Congress intended to strip us
of our jurisdiction.” 108 To resolve a conflict among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 109
Taking an exceedingly rare step, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan
refused to defend the lower court’s holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
to review the denial of the motion to reopen.110 Her refusal to defend the
102. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 239-40 (2010). In the seminal case of INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Court delineated the relative burdens of proving
claims to asylum and withholding of removal.
103. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 240.
104. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2014).
105. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 240.
106. Id.
107. See Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
108. Id. at 540 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
109. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 241. For circuits reaching conclusions contrary to that of
the Seventh Circuit, see Jahjaga v. Attorney General, 512 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2008); Singh v.
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2005);
Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359 (10th Cir. 2004); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2004). The Obama administration also later refused to defend a court of
appeals ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to review equitable tolling of the deadline to file a
motion to reopen. See Mata v. Holder, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
110. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 241-42.
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lower court ruling unquestionably signaled to the Supreme Court the
vulnerability of the decision and foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of the
case. 111 The Court appointed a law professor to defend the court of appeals’
decision. 112
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, which was
joined by all of the Justices except Justice Alito. 113 The Court
acknowledged that a motion to reopen removal proceedings is an
“‘important safeguard’” for noncitizens facing removal. 114 In the Court’s
estimation, the language of the statute, relevant legislative and regulatory
history, and the longstanding presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action115 all favored judicial review of the denial of a motion
to reopen the removal proceedings.116 The Court relied on the plain
language of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996. 117 The statute expressly barred the review of the discretionary
judgments by the Attorney General, not discretionary decisions delegated
by regulation by the Attorney General to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. 118

111. Id.
112. See id. The Court appointed Professor Amanda Leiter of Washington College of
Law at American University as counsel to defend the lower court ruling. Id.
113. Id. at 236.
114. Id. at 242 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18 (2008) (citation omitted)). The
Court previously had afforded considerable deference to the judgment of the BIA in
reviewing motions to reopen. See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); INS v.
Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 146 (1981). Lower courts frequently found that the Court’s decisions
generally required broad deference to the rulings of the Board. See, e.g., Jara-Navarrette v.
INS, 813 F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986); Hamid v. INS, 648 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 251-52 (citing, inter alia, Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)).
116. See id. at 243-53. For analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v.
Holder, see Michelle R. Slack, No One Agrees . . . But Me? An Alternative Approach to
Interpreting the Limits on Judicial Review of Procedural Motions and Requests for
Discretionary Immigration Relief After Kucana v. Holder, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2011);
Michael A. Keough, Note, Kucana v. Holder and Judicial Review of the Decision Not to
Reopen Sua Sponte in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075,
passim (2012).
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (as amended by the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) (providing that discretionary “action of
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security” is not subject to judicial
review) (emphasis added).
118. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 252.
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Contending the Court should have decided the case on narrower statutory
and regulatory grounds, Justice Alito concurred in the judgment. 119 Thus,
the Justices unanimously rejected the court of appeals’s conclusion that
motions to reopen were not subject to judicial review under the 1996
immigration reform legislation.
The Supreme Court in Kucana v. Holder therefore held that courts of
appeals continue to have jurisdiction under the 1996 reforms to review
denials of motions to reopen removal proceedings by the BIA. 120 This
holding builds on the Court’s line of decisions ensuring the judicial review
of removal decisions in the face of increasingly stringent congressional
restrictions.
It unquestionably would have represented a major change in the law if
the Supreme Court had eliminated the long-established judicial authority to
review motions to reopen removal proceedings. Noncitizens subject to
removal from the United States regularly file motions to reopen, seeking
among other things, to present new evidence in support of claims for relief
from removal. 121 Rather than taking what would have been an extraordinary
step of uncertain constitutionality, the Court cautiously opted to protect the
right to judicial review—a holding in tension with the plenary power
doctrine’s immunity from judicial scrutiny—and ensured the possibility for
courts to correct erroneous action by the executive branch. The Court
adhered to the general presumption favoring judicial review of agency
action. Congress, of course, could intervene to foreclose judicial review of
motions to reopen, but has not yet done so.
II. The 2010 Term
In the 2010 Term, the Supreme Court decided the first of two cases from
Arizona in consecutive Terms raising the contentious issue of state versus
federal power over immigration enforcement.122 Even though recognizing
federal primacy over immigration regulation, the Court relied on the plain
language of the statutory provision in question to conclude that federal
immigration law did not preempt the Arizona law. 123

119. Id. at 253 (Alito, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 237; see, e.g., INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94 (1988); INS. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139
(1981).
121. See supra note 120 (citing a series of Supreme Court motion to reopen decisions).
122. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
123. See infra Part II.A.
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In a rare occurrence, the Term also saw a deadlocked Court affirm the
refusal of a court of appeals to invalidate what amounts to discrimination
based on gender stereotypes in the nationality laws.124 The fact that the
Court was evenly split on the question suggests that the plenary power
doctrine—which the case implicated and which, if invoked, would have
barred judicial review—is in jeopardy. A near-majority of the Court, which
would likely have been a majority if Justice Kagan had not recused
herself, 125 appears to be ready to limit, if not eliminate, the scope of the
doctrine.
In two cases involving state and local laws touching on immigration, the
Court took actions that, although not deciding the merits, followed its
generally applicable practices. 126
A. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Federal Preemption of a State
Immigration Enforcement Law
In 1986, Congress passed a major immigration reform bill; the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) sought to deter
undocumented immigration by expressly prohibiting the employment of
undocumented immigrants. 127 The Act allows the imposition of civil
penalties, known as “employer sanctions,” on employers who violate the
proscription. 128 IRCA expressly preempts “any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.” 129

124. See infra Part II.B.
125. Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. at 2312.
126. See infra Part II.C.
127. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2012). The adverse impacts of employer sanctions,
including increased discrimination against national origin minorities, have been the subject
of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of
Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 389
(1994) (concluding that the elimination of employer sanctions is the most expedient way to
remedy the increased racial discrimination caused by their enforcement); Huyen Pham, The
Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 780-82 (2008) (analyzing the
ineffectiveness of employer sanctions and the national origin discrimination against lawful
workers resulting from their enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195
(arguing that employer sanctions regime has failed to deter undocumented immigration).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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In an effort to improve the ability of employers to comply with the
employer sanctions provisions, Congress in 1996 authorized the creation of
E-Verify, an internet-based system that allows employers to verify the work
authorization status of employees and job applicants.130 The law also
prohibits the U.S. government from mandating any person or entity
(including the states) other than the federal government to use E-Verify. 131
In a purported effort to facilitate immigration enforcement, the Arizona
legislature in 2007 passed the Arizona Legal Workers Act. 132 It provides for
the suspension or revocation of the licenses of Arizona businesses that
knowingly and intentionally employ undocumented immigrants.133 The Act
further requires employers in Arizona to utilize the federal E-Verify
database. 134
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various
business and civil rights organizations challenged the constitutionality of
the Arizona Legal Workers Act. They argued that federal immigration law
preempted its provisions. Both the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected the challenges. 135 Before the Supreme Court,
the Solicitor General filed a brief registering support of the U.S.
government for the federal preemption position advocated by the Chamber
of Commerce. 136

130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). The accuracy of the E-Verify database has been
questioned. See WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION 114 (2009),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20EVerify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf; Emily Patten, Note, E-Verify During a Period of
Economic Recovery and High Unemployment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 475, 482-83; see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2008) (“There is no clear way to fix employer sanctions
anytime soon. The widely discussed ‘smart cards’ or ‘swipe cards’ will be years in the
making. Meanwhile, massive work will need to be done on government databases to clean
up misspelled, duplicate, and false names.”) (citation omitted).
131. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act §§ 402(a),(e),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
132. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2014).
133. Id.
134. See id. § 23-212(I).
135. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2009);
Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp.2d 1036, 1045 (D. Ariz. 2008).
136. See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_0
9_10_09_115_PetitionerAmCuUSA.authcheckdam.pdf.
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In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 137 the Supreme Court, in a
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that federal
immigration law did not preempt the Arizona law. Although reiterating that
the “‘[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably . . . a federal
power,’” 138 the Court held that IRCA’s preemption provision expressly
preserves state authority to impose sanctions on employers of
undocumented immigrants “through licensing and similar laws”; it thus was
not expressly preempted. 139 A plurality of the Court also found that the
Arizona licensing law was not impliedly preempted by federal law. 140
The Court further concluded that federal immigration law did not
preempt Arizona’s E-Verify mandate. 141 In reaching that conclusion, the
majority reasoned that the fact that the statute expressly prohibits the
federal government from mandating use of E-Verify by private employers
does not mean that the states cannot do so. 142
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. 143 Justice
Sotomayor dissented separately. 144 The analysis of the two dissents differed
from the majority primarily with respect to the interpretation and
application of IRCA’s preemption provision to the Arizona Legal Workers
Act. 145
Whiting is a narrowly drawn decision dealing with the interpretation and
application of the language of the Immigration Reform and Control Act.
The Court carefully adhered to the plain meaning of the statute, which
137. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011). Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. See id.
138. Id. at 1974 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)) (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 1977-81 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012)).
140. See id. at 1981-85.
141. See id. at 1985-86.
142. See id. at 1985.
143. See id. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer expressed concern with the
possible civil rights impacts of the Arizona Legal Workers Act on Latina/o workers resulting
from its heightened penalties for the employment of undocumented immigrants, which
included suspension and possible loss of a business license. See id. at 1061-26; see also
supra note 128 and accompanying text (citing authorities expressing concern that employer
sanction provisions contribute to national origin discrimination).
144. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In Mohawk Indus., Inc.
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009), Justice Sotomayor employed the term
“undocumented immigrants” for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion. See Cristina M.
Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the Decision of
Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. F. 499 (2014) (analyzing Justice Sotomayor’s
immigration opinions on the court of appeals and Supreme Court).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 137-44.
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expressly preserves state authority to exercise the licensing power to
facilitate enforcement of the employer sanctions provisions of the federal
immigration laws. In so doing, the Court declined to find that the Arizona
Legal Workers Act impermissibly infringed on the federal power to
regulate immigration.146 A majority of the Court applied a conventional
reading of the text of the statute to find that federal immigration law did not
preempt the Arizona law.
A number of commentators expressed concern that the decision in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting signaled the Supreme Court’s
willingness to uphold other more aggressive state and local immigration
enforcement measures.147 The Court’s refusal to disturb the Arizona law
appears to have encouraged state legislatures to enact increasingly strict
immigration enforcement laws. 148 Nonetheless, the Whiting decision
employed a straightforward federal preemption analysis based on a plain
meaning interpretation of the statutory provision in question. The analysis
is clearly within the jurisprudential mainstream.

146. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977-81.
147. See Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The “Arizonification” of Immigration Law: Implications
of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting for State and Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 85, 117 (2012); see also Gregory Delassus, Note, Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting and the Future of State Immigration Laws, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 613, 614 (2012)
(“[T]he Supreme Court [in Whiting] should have reversed existing precedents and secured
control of immigration law at the Federal level. Such an outcome would have prevented
further impractical immigration restrictions, created a more uniform and predictable frame of
reference for employers’ immigration questions, and enhanced compliance with the law.”);
Keelan Diana, Comment, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting: The Possibility of AntiDiscriminatory Immigration Reform in an Era of Resurgent Federalism, 12 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 196, 199 (2012) (“In an era of extreme anti-immigrant
sentiment, Whiting signifies not only that the Supreme Court will allow states to perform
functions that have traditionally fallen within the purview of the federal government, but
more importantly that the Court may be willing to tolerate states like Arizona and Alabama
enacting even more harmful legislation.”) (emphasis added); Krystal D. Norton, Note,
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Why the States Are Permitted to Pass a Tidal Wave of
New State Laws So Dangerously Intertwined with Federal Immigration Law, 57 LOY. L.
REV. 673, 675 (2011) (“In Whiting, the Court . . . started the ball rolling on allowing states to
pass more restrictive statutes on the basis of U.S. immigration status.”).
148. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to
Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 617 (2012) (contending that the enactment of
increasing numbers of state and local immigration enforcement laws had potential negative
civil rights implications for Latina/os).
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B. Flores-Villar v. United States: The Plenary Power Doctrine and Gender
Distinctions in the Nationality Laws
In United States v. Flores-Villar, 149 the Ninth Circuit rejected a
constitutional challenge to a federal law that established different standards
for obtaining U.S. citizenship for children born outside of the United States
to unmarried parents, depending on whether the child’s mother or father
was a U.S. citizen; the law favored mothers over fathers with respect to
bestowing citizenship on children.150 An equally divided four-four Court,
with Justice Kagan recusing herself, deadlocked, thereby affirming the
court of appeals’ ruling that upheld the gender distinction in the nationality
law. 151
Flores-Villar is one of several occasions in recent years in which the
Supreme Court has grappled with the constitutionality of gender-based
distinctions in the immigration and nationality laws.152 The Court has not
hesitated to invalidate similar distinctions based on gender stereotypes in
other laws. 153 Such distinctions, however, remain in several provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which the plenary power doctrine
historically has shielded from meaningful constitutional review.154
The fact that the Supreme Court was equally divided in Flores-Villar
places in doubt the future vitality of the plenary power doctrine, which is
149. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994-98 (9th Cir. 2008). For criticism of
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see Eric Newhouse, Note, “He’s Not Your Real Dad”: In
United States v. Flores-Villar, The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Denied Equal Protection that
Would Enable a Father to Transmit United States Citizenship to His Foreign-Born Child, 45
CREIGHTON L. REV. 581 (2012).
150. See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994-95 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409 (1976)).
151. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011).
152. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-62, 73 (2001) (upholding U.S. citizenship
provision favoring illegitimate children of naturalized mothers over fathers); Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1998) (refusing to invalidate a similar gender-based
distinction in nationality laws). For analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in this area, see
generally Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at
Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405 (2013); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE
L.J. 2134 (2014); Nina Pillard, Comment, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835 (2002); Jessica Portmess, Comment,
Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of the Defense of Marriage Act in
Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1825 (2012).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (striking down
Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admission policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (invalidating university’s single-sex admission policy).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
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the bedrock of immigration exceptionalism. At least four Justices
apparently would not have applied the doctrine to protect the law in
question from judicial review and would have struck down the genderbased distinction. Although speculation about the votes of Justices is
hazardous at best, the Justice who recused herself, Elena Kagan, might well
be expected to side in the future, as she often does, with the Court’s more
liberal Justices. 155
C. Federal Preemption of State and Local Immigration Enforcement Laws
Besides the merits decisions of the 2010 Term, the Supreme Court took
notable action in two cases addressing the lawfulness of state and local laws
touching on immigration.
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Federal Preemption of a Local
Immigration Enforcement Ordinance
In light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 156 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded a court of appeals decision
striking down, on federal preemption grounds, much of a controversial
ordinance that the Hazleton, Pennsylvania city council passed in the name
of facilitating immigration enforcement.157 The council passed the
ordinance after heated public debate marred by palpable expression of antiLatina/o sentiment. 158 Along with other immigration enforcement-oriented
measures, the Hazleton ordinance would have, among other things,
prohibited landlords from renting housing to undocumented immigrants. 159
The ordinance was one of the plethora of state and local immigration
enforcement laws passed in the early years of the new millennium that

155. See Adam Liptak, With Eyes on His Vote in Health Subsidies Case, Roberts Lets on
Little, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at A17 (reiterating the view that, based on voting patterns,
Justice Kagan is one of the liberal members of the current Supreme Court).
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176-81, 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2010),
vacated by City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
158. See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 209 n.31.
159. For analysis of legal issues raised by the challenge to the Hazleton ordinance, see
Jamie Longazel & Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Exploiting Borders: The Political Economy of
Local Backlash Against Undocumented Immigrants, 30 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 43 (2011);
Rachel E. Morse, Following Lozano v. Hazleton: Keep States and Cities Out of the
Immigration Business, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 513 (2008) (book review); Mark S. Grube,
Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling
Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2010).
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signaled increasing public frustration with federal immigration
enforcement. 160
When issues raised in a petition for certiorari are similar to those recently
decided by the Court, the Supreme Court routinely grants certiorari,
vacates, and remands the lower court decision for further consideration in
light of the new decision. 161 The Court in the Hazleton case followed its
standard practice and vacated and remanded the court of appeals’s decision
in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting. 162 Some commentators read
the Court’s action as suggesting that the Court in the future might be
willing to approve more aggressive state and local immigration
enforcement measures.163 Such a development would signify a deviation
from past practice and represent an arguably extreme change in the law.164

160. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617 (explaining how the changing regional
demographics of immigration and tightening state and local budgets contributed to the
enactment of a record number of state and local immigration laws); supra text
accompanying note and note 147 (mentioning commentators who feared that the Supreme
Court decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting would result in an increase in state and
local efforts to enforce the U.S. immigration laws); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, 2010 IMMIGRATION-RELATED BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES
(JANUARY-MARCH 2010), at 1 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://ncsl.org/portals/1/
documents/immig/immigration_report_april2010.pdf (“With federal immigration reform
currently stalled in Congress, state legislatures continue to tackle immigration issues at an
unprecedented rate.”). See generally STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN
IMMIGRATION POLICY (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014) (collecting
essays analyzing the propriety of increased state and local immigration enforcement).
161. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (mentioning how the Court vacated
and remanded the rulings in eighteen cases in light of its decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 147-148. The fear that Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting would open the door to courts upholding state and local immigration enforcement
laws proved to be unfounded. On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding
that federal immigration law preempted the core provisions of the Hazleton ordinance. See
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court subsequently denied the
City of Hazleton’s petition for certiorari and declined to review the court of appeals decision
invalidating much of the city ordinance. See City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. 1491
(2014); infra Part V.B.1.
164. See supra Part II.A.
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2. Martinez v. Regents of the University of California: Public University
Fees for Undocumented Residents
In Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge under federal law 165 to a
state law 166 that allows certain graduates of California high schools,
including undocumented immigrants, to pay the same fees as state residents
to attend the University of California, state universities, and community
colleges. 167 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. 168
The California Supreme Court decision rested on the interpretation of
federal law and garnered considerable public attention. 169 Nonetheless, the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to disturb the court’s ruling. That refusal
suggests that the Court is reluctant to interfere in decisions generally
reserved to the states, such as those concerning the fees that state public
colleges and universities charge to undocumented residents, including
immigrant students. 170

165. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012) (“[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United
States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within in a state (or a political
subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the
United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope)
without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.”).
166. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2014). Through this and other laws, California in
recent years has sought to improve access of undocumented students to California public
colleges and universities. See CALIFORNIA DREAM ACT OF 2011 BILL ANALYSIS 1-6 (2011),
available
at
http://www.legin
fo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_01010150/ab_130_cfa_20110607_133225_sen_comm.html; see also California DREAM Act,
A.B. 130, 2011-12 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (making undocumented California residents eligible to
receive scholarships derived from nonfederal funds).
167. Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010).
For analysis of the Martinez decision, see Kyle William Colvin, Note, In-State Tuition and
Illegal Immigrants: An Analysis of Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 2010
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 391; Beverly N. Rich, Note, Tracking AB 540’s Potential Resilience:
An Analysis of In-State Tuition for Undocumented Students in Light of Martinez v. Regents
of the University of California, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2010).
168. Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (citing federal statute).
170. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the
Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 108-29 (2008). But see Toll v. Moreno,
458 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1982) (holding that federal law barred state of Maryland from denying instate resident fees at a public university to lawfully admitted nonimmigrant students).
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III. The 2011 Term
The 2011 Term saw the Supreme Court decide five immigration cases, a
relatively large number for one Term. In one of the most important
immigration decisions in years, the Court in Arizona v. United States 171
ruled in a rather unremarkable, workmanlike way to reinforce federal
supremacy over immigration enforcement and invalidate core provisions of
a controversial Arizona immigration enforcement law.
In addition, the Supreme Court decided four more ordinary immigration
cases in the 2011 Term, a large number of immigration cases for it to
decide on the merits in a single Term. Those decisions offer critically
important insights into how the Court approaches the bread-and-butter of
the federal courts’ immigration docket. Despite the fact that the
immigration laws are tough on noncitizens convicted of criminal
offenses, 172 the Court approached the cases as standard exercises of
statutory interpretation, administrative deference, and the application of
other generally applicable doctrines.
All five immigration decisions of the 2011 Term fall squarely into the
mainstream of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Immigrants won three of
the cases, which is not a bad win-loss percentage in light of the strict laws
being applied and the deference generally afforded the government.
A. Arizona v. United States: Federal Preemption of a State Immigration
Enforcement Law
With Congress failing to enact immigration reform, despite attempts
spanning nearly a decade, 173 a growing number of state legislatures passed
laws purportedly designed to facilitate immigration enforcement.174 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which
upheld Arizona’s business licensing law, arguably encouraged state and
local governments to act in the name of immigration enforcement. 175

171. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012); see Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers:
Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 299
(2013) (“Arizona v. United States was a watershed decision because it reaffirmed a model of
federalism that accords deference to Congress in regulating immigration and in delegating
broad rule-making authority to the Executive.”).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
173. See, e.g., Kevin. R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2009).
174. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
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In 2010, the Arizona legislature passed the Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, popularly known as SB 1070. 176
This new immigration enforcement measure was considerably broader in
scope than the Arizona Legal Workers Act upheld by the Court in Whiting;
SB 1070 generated substantial national controversy for its tough brand of
state immigration enforcement.177
SB 1070's “stated purpose is to ‘discourage and deter the unlawful entry
and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present
in the United States. . . . The law’s provisions establish an official state
policy of ‘attrition through enforcement.”178 The court of appeals struck
down four central provisions of the law. 179
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve important questions
concerning the interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law
of immigration and alien status.” 180 Court watchers predicted that a
conservative Court might well uphold much, if not all, of the Arizona law,
which many conservatives championed.181
176. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). For analysis of the myriad of legal
issues raised by SB 1070, see Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010).
177. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in
Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL. 367,
368-69 (2013); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in Arizona, 1 COLUM. J. RACE &
L. 168, passim (2012); Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and SB 1070: Demonization,
Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35 (2011); David A.
Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070
Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523 (2011); see also
George A. Martínez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology of Whiteness, the
Geography of Race, Interest Convergence, and the View from the Perspective of Critical
Theory, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175 (2012) (analyzing adverse impacts on Latina/os, immigrants
and citizens alike, of a series of laws enacted by the Arizona legislature, including SB 1070).
178. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a vigorous defense of the “attrition by enforcement” strategy,
which sees increased removals as a path toward decreasing the overall size of the
undocumented immigrant population in the United States, see Kris W. Kobach, Attrition
Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 155 (2008).
179. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
180. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (citation omitted).
181. See Dan Nowicki, SB 1070 Supreme Court Ruling May Impact U.S. Races, ARIZ.
CENT. (June 2, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/05/31/2012053
1sb-1070-supreme-court-impact-races.html; Mike Sacks, SB 1070: Supreme Court Appears to
Favor Arizona on Controversial Immigration Law, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 25, 2012,
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In Arizona v. United States, the Court—in a majority opinion by Justice
Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor—largely agreed with the Ninth Circuit and invalidated three
core provisions of SB 1070. 182 A five-three Court found that federal
immigration law preempted sections 3 (creating a state crime for failing to
carry an alien registration document), 5(c) (making it a crime under state
law to work without authorization), and 6 (authorizing the warrantless
arrest of persons believed to have committed an offense making them
removable from the United States). 183
A majority of the Court upheld one provision of SB 1070. 184 Section
2(B) of the law requires state and local law enforcement officers to verify
the immigration status of persons who they reasonably suspect of being in
the country in violation of the immigration laws. 185 Refusing to invalidate
the provision on its face, the Court left open the possibility of challenges to
its application by Arizona law enforcement authorities in individual
cases. 186
Not able to agree among themselves, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
all filed separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.187 Most
jarring among the opinions was Justice Scalia’s, who would have upheld
SB 1070 in its entirety. 188 Exhibiting a strident ideological tone relatively
rare in a Supreme Court opinion, his partial dissent noted at the outset that
[t]he United States is an indivisible “Union of sovereign States.”
Today’s opinion, approving virtually all of the Ninth Circuit’s
injunction against enforcement of the four challenged provisions
of Arizona’s law, deprives States of what most would consider
the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude
from the sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be

http://huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/25/sb-1070-supreme-court-arizona-immigration-law_n_145
1622.html; Hannah Yi, Arizona Preps for SB 1070 Ruling, PBS, (June 15, 2012), http://
www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/arizona-preps-for-sb-1070-ruling/14067/.
182. See 132 S. Ct. at 2510-11. Justice Kagan did not participate in the consideration or
decision in the case. See id. at 2511.
183. See id. at 2510.
184. See id. at 2507-10.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 2510.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-194.
188. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2511-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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there. Neither the Constitution itself nor even any law passed by
Congress supports this result. . . .
....
. . . As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude
persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations
expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by
Congress. 189
Justice Scalia proceeded to express disapproval of, if not outright disdain
for, the Obama administration’s immigration policy choices, including
some that appeared to be only marginally related to the Arizona law before
the Court. 190 In conclusion, Justice Scalia sarcastically quipped that “[i]f
securing its territory [through SB 1070] is not within the power of Arizona,
we should cease referring to it as a sovereign State.”191 Attracting
considerable media attention, his stinging rebuke of the majority opinion
was more often than not criticized as excessive. 192
Although agreeing with Justice Scalia that federal law did not preempt
any of SB 1070, Justice Thomas reached that conclusion through more
conventional federal preemption analysis and without Justice Scalia’s
strident criticism of the Obama administration’s immigration policy
choices. 193 Adhering to precedent, Justice Alito would have only found
section 3, involving noncitizen registration, to be preempted by federal
immigration law. 194

189. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
190. See id. at 2521 (criticizing the Obama administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program that temporarily deferred the removal of undocumented
immigrants brought to the United States as children).
191. Id. at 2522.
192. See Dana Milbank, On Arizona Immigration Law, Justice Scalia and Street Protesters
Make Same Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/onarizona-immigration-law-justice-scalia-and-street-protesters-make-same-case/2012/04/25/gIQ
Ar6LmhT_story.html; Nathan Pippenger, Scalia Reveals How Little He Knows About
Immigration Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/politics/102973/justices-supreme-court-conservative-immigration-laws;
David
G.
Savage, Did Justice Antonin Scalia Go Too Far This Time?, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2012, http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/27/nation/la-na-scalia-20120627.
193. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
194. Id. at 2524 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court previously
had invalidated a similar provision in a Pennsylvania law. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 72 (1941).
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As noted above, the Court’s upholding of section 2(B) of SB 1070
generated considerable concern and criticism. 195 Popularly known as the
“show your papers” requirement, this provision, which can be found in
many of the new immigration enforcement laws passed by the states,196
mandates state and local police to verify the immigration status of anyone
about whom they have a “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful presence in the
United States. 197 Critics worried that implementation of section 2(B) would
result in increased racial profiling of Latina/os by state and local officers in
criminal law enforcement. 198 By focusing on the technical federal
preemption challenge and reserving the possibility of future “as applied”
challenges, the majority’s approach allowed the Court to sidestep the most
frequently voiced civil rights concern with SB 1070. 199
The Court in Arizona v. United States, including all of the separate
opinions (except perhaps Justice Scalia’s), applied generally applicable
federal preemption doctrine in a relatively unremarkable way. That
application resembled the analysis in which the Court has engaged in
deciding whether federal law preempted state laws in other substantive
areas, 200 as well as its by-the-books decision the previous Term in Chamber
of Commerce v. Whiting. 201
Although the Court made it clear that federal power preempted various
enforcement efforts in Arizona v. United States and ensured federal primacy
over immigration regulation, 202 its decision the previous term in Whiting
195. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 630 (describing how § 2(B)’s requirement that state
and local police verify the immigration status of persons whom they have a “reasonable
suspicion” to believe are unlawfully in the United States is one of the most controversial
features of SB 1070); see also Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s SB 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive
Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 331-33 (2012) (analyzing claim that SB
1070 would increase racial profiling by local law enforcement).
196. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617.
197. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
198. See supra note 177.
199. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01.
200. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88 (2000)
(holding that federal law preempted Massachusetts law that restricted the ability of state
agencies to purchase goods or services from companies that did business with Burma
(Myanmar)); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (ruling that
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act preempted state environmental regulation).
201. See supra Part II.A (discussing Whiting).
202. For analysis of recent developments in federal preemption of state and local
immigration enforcement laws, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV.
601 (2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
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made it equally clear that Congress ensured some room for the states to act
in the realm of immigration enforcement.203 In striking down core
provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 as intruding on the federal power to
regulate immigration, the Supreme Court surprised many observers who
predicted that the conservative Roberts Court would uphold the law in its
entirety. 204
B. Judulang v. Holder: Relief from Removal
Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, repealed in
1996, 205 provided for a “waiver of excludability” allowing a noncitizen to
secure relief preventing removal from the country despite a criminal
conviction. 206 The Supreme Court in Judulang v. Holder addressed a
question about the availability of that form of relief to a lawful permanent
resident convicted of a crime. 207
The U.S. government sought to remove from the United States Joel
Judulang, a lawful permanent resident from the Philippines who had lived
in this country since 1974, based on a 1989 voluntary manslaughter
conviction. 208 The U.S. government argued that Judulang should be
removed from the United States because he had committed an “aggravated
felony” involving a “crime of violence.” 209 The BIA ruled, and the Ninth

MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration
Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 NYU L. REV. 2074 (2013); Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013); Kit Johnson & Peter J. Spiro, Debate:
Immigration Preemption After United States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100
(2012),
available
at
http://scholarship.
law.upenn.edu/cgl/viewcontent/cgi?article=1095&context=penn_law_review_online;
Karla
Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
333 (2013); Daniel J. Tichenor & Alexandra Filindra, Raising Arizona v. United States:
Historical Patterns of American Immigration Federalism, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1215,
passim (2012).
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. See supra note 181 (citing news reports to this effect).
205. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597 (1952) (repealed 1996).
206. The Court had previously ruled that noncitizens could apply for § 212(c) relief
based on criminal convictions before Congress repealed the statutory provision in 1996
immigration reforms. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
207. 132 S. Ct. 476, 479-82 (2011).
208. See id. at 477.
209. Id.
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Circuit agreed, that a “crime of violence” was not “comparable” to any
ground for exclusion for which a waiver of excludability was available and
Judulang thus was not eligible for relief from removal under section
212(c). 210 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the
question. 211
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan flatly rejected the BIA’s
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions:
This case concerns the Board of Immigration Appeals’ . . .
policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the
Attorney General for relief from deportation under a nowrepealed provision of the immigration laws. We hold that the
BIA’s approach is arbitrary and capricious.
The legal background of this case is complex, but the
principle guiding our decision is anything but. When an
administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned
explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is an
unwavering one. Here, the BIA has failed to meet it. 212
In reaching that conclusion, the Court applied mainstream administrative
law principles borrowed from the Administrative Procedure Act 213 and, far
from rubber-stamping the agency ruling, found that the BIA’s ruling
“flunked” minimal judicial review.214 The Court bluntly emphasized that
“[w]e must reverse an agency policy when we cannot discern a reason for
it. That is the trouble in this case.” 215 The Court further noted that the BIA’s
arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the statute failed to warrant

210. See In re Judulang, A34 461 941-EL Centro, 2006 WL 557842, at *2 (B.I.A. Feb. 3,
2006); Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 F. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded by
132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
211. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 & n.6 (citing lower court decisions in conflict on
this question).
212. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
213. See id. at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The Court looked to the Administrative
Procedure Act even though it technically does not apply to removal proceedings. See
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1955).
214. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484.
215. Id. at 490. Influential jurist Judge Richard Posner, well known for his law and
economics approach to the law, has been similarly harsh in criticizing BIA rulings. See
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 167987 (2007).
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deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 216 the
seminal administrative law decision articulating the standard applicable to
the review of an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.217
The Judulang Court applied the same basic principles of statutory
interpretation to the immigration laws that it generally applies to the
interpretation of other statutes.218 The Court’s unanimous opinion is nothing
less than a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and the U.S.
government’s defense of it. In addition, the decision follows the trend of
subjecting the immigration decisions of the BIA to the same general
standards of judicial review that apply to actions of other administrative
agencies. 219
C. Kawashima v. Holder: Removal for Tax Crimes
In Kawashima v. Holder, 220 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a six-three
decision by Justice Thomas, affirmed a court of appeals holding that a tax
crime was an aggravated felony under the U.S. immigration laws, which
216. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7 (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
217. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074 (1990). For provocative
questioning of the meaningfulness of judicial review of administrative decisions under
Chevron and other deference doctrines, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009).
218. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent
Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 332
(2012). See generally Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When
Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 NYU ANN. SURV AM. L. 503
(2013).
219. For analysis of Judulang v. Holder, see Adjoa Anim-Appiah, Raising the Standard:
Judulang v. Holder Condemns the Use of Arbitrary and Capricious Policies When
Determining Eligibility for the Section 212(c) Waiver, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 261 (2013); Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2012); Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits
Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future
Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (2012); see also Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are
Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 367, 403-07 (2013) (viewing Court’s reliance on administrative law principles
in Judulang as a way of avoiding the recognition of constitutional rights of immigrants). The
BIA later implemented the Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder to ensure the appropriate
availability of § 212(c) relief. See In re Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014).
220. 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1176 (2012).
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would subject an immigrant to mandatory removal from the United States.
Akio and Fusako Kawashima, lawful permanent residents from Japan who
had lived in the United States since 1984, were convicted for the filing, and
aiding and abetting in the filing, of a false statement on a corporate tax
return. The immigration question was whether the crimes constituted
aggravated felonies, thereby requiring removal. 221 Engaging in a
straightforward interpretation of the text of the statute, the Court agreed
with the BIA and the court of appeals that the tax crimes at issue did in fact
constitute aggravated felonies. 222
At times, the Supreme Court has applied the rule of lenity to interpret
ambiguities in the removal provisions of the immigration laws in favor of
the noncitizen resisting deportation. 223 However, a majority of the Court in
Kawashima found that there was no ambiguity in the statutory provision in
question. 224
Joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg dissented. 225
Reading the statute as more ambiguous than the majority, she relied on the
rule of lenity as justifying interpretation of the statute in favor of the
noncitizens. 226 Justice Ginsburg, therefore, concluded that the Kawashimas’
tax crimes failed to constitute aggravated felonies.227
As often is the case in immigration cases, the majority and the dissent in
Kawashima engaged in a debate over the proper construction of complex
U.S. immigration laws. And, as is common in the Court’s decisions, the
majority and dissent employed contrasting methods of statutory
interpretation. 228 The majority focused on the plain meaning of the statute;

221. See id. at 1170.
222. See id. at 1176.
223. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); supra text accompanying notes
93-95.
224. See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (“[T]he Kawashimas argue that [the
statute] . . . is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the statute in their favor. It
is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien’s
favor. . . . We think the application of the present statute clear enough that resort to the rule
of lenity is not warranted.”) (emphasis added)).
225. Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 1177-80.
227. See id. at 1181.
228. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88
(2004). For commentary on the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence, see
generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/5

2015]

IMMIGRATION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 2009-13

95

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent read the statutory text and its structure
differently. 229 In interpreting the relevant provisions of the immigration
law, all of the Justices looked to a generally-applicable legal principle—the
rule of lenity—but reached different conclusions about whether it
applied. 230
D. Vartelas v. Holder: Retroactive Application of Immigration Reforms
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) added Immigration and Nationality Act section
101(a)(13)(C)(v), 231 which changed the definition of “admission” into the
United States. That new provision deems a lawful permanent resident
returning from a brief trip outside the country who had been convicted of
certain criminal offenses to be seeking initial admission into the country;
that noncitizen thus is subject to all of the inadmissibility provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 232
Panagis Vartelas originally came lawfully to the United States in 1979
on a student visa and later became a lawful permanent resident. 233 In 1994,
he pleaded guilty to a felony of conspiring to make a counterfeit security
and subsequently served a four-month sentence. 234 Relying on the 1996
amendment, the U.S. government denied admission to Vartelas upon his
return to the United States after a brief visit to Greece in 2003, because the
previous counterfeiting conviction was a “crime involving moral
turpitude.” 235
Before 1996, a lawful permanent resident in Vartelas’s situation would
have been able to take a short trip out of the country without risking denial
of re-entry. 236 Even after 1996, Vartelas would not have been subject to

Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 225-27.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 220-27.
231. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
232. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
233. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483, 1485 (2012).
234. See id. at 1483.
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
236. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (holding that an “innocent, casual and
brief” trip outside the United States by a lawful permanent resident was not a departure
warranting the treatment of the return to the country as a new “entry” subject to the full array
of exclusion grounds).
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removal if he had not traveled outside the United States. 237 However, as the
U.S. government interpreted the 1996 provision, Vartelas could be denied
admission back into the country because of a brief trip outside the United
States. 238
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the
circuits on the question.239 In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg for a six-three
majority, the Court rejected the BIA’s order that Vartelas be returned to
Greece:
We conclude that the relevant provision of IIRIRA, §
1101(a)(13)(C)(v), attached a new disability (denial of reentry)
in respect to past events (Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA offense, plea, and
conviction). Guided by the deeply rooted presumption against
retroactive legislation, we hold that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does
not apply to Vartelas’ conviction.240
To reach that conclusion, the Court applied the general “presumption
against retroactive legislation” and the retroactivity doctrine articulated in
its 1994 decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 241 The Court held that,
in pleading guilty to the criminal charge in 1994, Vartelas “likely relied” 242
on the law as it existed at that time, which allowed him to take brief trips
outside the United States without risking denial of re-entry into the
country. 243
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia dissented. 244 The
dissent viewed the activity regulated by the 1996 amendment to the
immigration laws as Vartelas’ reentry into the United States after a trip
outside the country after 1996, rather than the decision to plead guilty to a
criminal offense before 1996. 245 Consequently, the BIA, in Justice Scalia’s
estimation, did not retroactively apply the new statutory language of the
1996 act; the test for whether retroactive application of the law was
constitutional therefore should not apply. 246 Vartelas’s readmission to the
United States involved a trip in 2003 that occurred years after the effective
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1483.
See id. at 1483-84.
Id. at 1486 (citing cases).
Id. at 1483-84.
511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1491.
See id. at 1483-84.
See id. at 1492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1493.
Id. at 1493-94.
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date of the legislation.247 Justice Scalia chastised the majority for evading
the plain meaning of the statute to achieve what it deemed to be the fair
result in the case. 248
In sum, the Supreme Court found for Vartelas in an opinion that, relying
on the generally applicable test for the retroactive application of new laws,
concluded that the application of the 1996 amendments to Vartelas’ case
would be unconstitutional. 249 The majority and the dissent differed
primarily with respect to the application of standard retroactivity doctrine to
Vartelas’s brief trip to Greece. A majority ruled that he could not be
constitutionally subject to retroactive application of the 1996
amendment. 250
E. Holder v. Gutierrez: Eligibility for Relief from Removal
In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court reviewed the BIA’s ruling that
the years of a parent’s residency in the United States could not be imputed
to a minor child for purposes of calculating the years of residence necessary
for eligibility for relief from removal known as “cancellation of
removal.” 251 A split in the circuits had developed on this question of
statutory construction.252
In 1989, the family of five-year-old Carlos Martinez Gutierrez brought
him unlawfully from Mexico to the United States. 253 Two years later,
Martinez Gutierrez’s father was admitted to the country as a lawful
permanent resident. 254 More than a decade later, in 2003, the U.S.
government granted Martinez Gutierrez lawful immigration status. He was
later apprehended for smuggling undocumented immigrants across the
U.S.-Mexico border. 255 To defend against removal from the United States,
Martinez Gutierrez sought cancellation of removal. 256 The immigration
court concluded that, even though Martinez Gutierrez himself did not
247. Id. at 1496.
248. See id. at 1495.
249. For application of Vartelas, see United States v. Gill, 748 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2014).
250. Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1491-92.
251. Holder v. Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2020-21 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b
(requiring, among other things, continuing presence in the United States of seven years for
lawful permanent residents, and ten years for undocumented immigrants and other
noncitizens, to be eligible for cancellation of removal).
252. See Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2016 (citing conflicting court of appeals’ decisions).
253. Id. at 2016-17.
254. See id. at 2016.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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satisfy the statutory requirement of seven years of continuous residence in
the United States, he qualified for this relief based on his father’s
residency. 257 The BIA reversed. 258 The court of appeals granted Martinez
Gutierrez’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for
reconsideration. 259
A companion case had similar facts. In 1995, fifteen-year-old Damien
Sawyers was admitted as a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica.260 At
that time, his mother had lawfully entered the country and resided in the
country for six years. 261 In 2002, Sawyers was convicted of a drug offense,
and the U.S. government initiated proceedings to remove him from the
country. 262 The immigration court found Sawyers to be ineligible for
cancellation of removal because he was a few months short of the seven
years of continuous residence required by the statute and refused to impute
his mother’s years of residency to him. 263 The BIA denied the petition for
review, but the court of appeals disagreed.264
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan deferred to the BIA’s
construction of the statutory provision in question. 265 The Court concluded
that the Board’s refusal to impute of the time of parent’s residence to the
child for purposes of eligibility for relief from removal was a reasonable
construction of the ambiguous statutory provision in question. 266
Accordingly, the Court found that the agency’s interpretation was entitled
to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 267
The Court’s decision in Holder v. Gutierrez has all the trappings of the
run-of-the-mill Chevron deference case. 268 That it was a unanimous

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2017.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2014-15.
266. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). For criticism of the Court’s decision, see Johanna K.P.
Dennis, “Mommy, Where Is Home?”: Imputing Parental Immigration Status and Residency
for Undocumented Immigrant Children, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 991 (2012).
267. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For analysis of the Supreme Court’s application of Chevron
deference to immigration cases, see supra note 218 (citing authorities).
268. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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decision, with the opinion assigned to the most junior Justice, suggests that
the Court did not find the decision to be particularly controversial. The
Court merely addressed an ordinary immigration case in a routine fashion.
IV. The 2012 Term
In the 2012 Term, the Supreme Court handed down two merits decisions
in immigration cases. In one significant case, the Court rejected the
mandatory removal of a long-term lawful permanent resident based on a
single criminal conviction involving possession of a small amount of
marijuana. 269 The Court in another case applied generally applicable legal
doctrine in refusing to retroactively apply its decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky, which expanded the right to effective assistance of counsel to
include appraisal of the possible immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction under a plea agreement. 270
The Court in the 2012 Term also denied certiorari and declined to review
a court of appeals decision striking down much of Alabama’s controversial
immigration enforcement law, which represented a brand of immigration
enforcement even stricter, in certain respects, than Arizona’s.271
A. Moncrieffe v. Holder: Removal for Marijuana Possession
Adrian Moncrieffe was lawfully brought to the United States from
Jamaica in 1984 at age three.272 He had two U.S. citizen children. 273 In
2007, local police stopped Moncrieffe while he was driving his automobile
on the interstate in Georgia, en route to Miami, Florida, after a short visit
with his daughter in Atlanta. 274 Police found 1.3 grams of marijuana (about
two or three cigarettes) in the vehicle.275 Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to
269. See infra Part IV.A.
270. See infra Part IV.B.
271. See infra Part IV.C.
272. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013).
273. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (No. 11702) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_
preview/briefs/11-702_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf.
274. See id. at 5. For a detailed analysis of the facts upon which about the stop and arrest
culminating in Moncrieffe’s criminal conviction, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in
the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967 (2015).
275. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. Possession of a small amount of marijuana for
personal use would not violate current law in several states. See Brandy Zadrozny, From Dry to
High: Your Guide to State Pot Laws, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:45 AM ET), http:// www. the
dailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/29/from-dry-to-high-your-guide-to-state-pot-laws.html (reporting
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violating a Georgia law criminalizing a broad range of conduct, from the
possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use to distribution
of large quantities for sale.276 He successfully completed probation. 277 The
marijuana conviction was Moncrieffe’s one and only criminal conviction in
his decades of lawful residence in the United States.278
Two years later, U.S. immigration officials arrested, detained, and
initiated removal proceedings against Moncrieffe, claiming that the
marijuana conviction constituted an aggravated felony under the
immigrations laws. 279 The immigration court ordered Moncrieffe removed
from the United States. 280 The BIA affirmed and the Fifth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Edith Jones, denied the petition for review of the removal
order. 281
In a seven-two decision, 282 the Supreme Court resolved a split among the
circuits 283 concerning whether a conviction under a state statute that
criminalizes conduct characterized by both the Controlled Substance Act’s
felony and misdemeanor provisions constitutes an aggravated felony under
the immigration laws, thus rendering the noncitizen ineligible for
cancellation of removal. 284 Following the “categorical approach” to the
classification of state criminal offenses as aggravated felonies for purposes
of removal under federal law, 285 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, held that the conviction under Georgia law criminalizing
possession of a small amount of marijuana (as was the case for Moncrieffe)
that sixteen states have decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal
use).
276. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685-87.
277. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 273, at 5-6.
278. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683-84.
279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012).
280. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683.
281. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 389, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d and
remanded by 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
282. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1678.
283. See id. at 1684 n.3 (noting conflicting court of appeals decisions).
284. Id. at 1684.
285. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer Lee
Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining
the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2012); Laura Jean
Eichten, Comment, A Felony, I Presume? 21 USC § 841(b)’s Mitigating Provision and the
Categorical Approach in Immigration Proceedings, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093 (2012). The
Court also followed the categorical approach in an analogous setting in another case in the
2012 Term, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
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as well as actual distribution of controlled substances,286 failed to constitute
an aggravated felony
In Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court for the second time in the last five
Terms rejected the U.S. government’s assertion that a minor drug offense
constituted an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.287 Those
decisions together demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to subject long-term
lawful permanent residents of the United States to the equival of mandatory
removal based on relatively small-time drug convictions. In both instances,
the Court exercised ordinary review of the administrative agency decision
and rejected the agency’s interpretation of the immigration laws.
B. Chaidez v. United States: Retroactive Application of Padilla v. Kentucky
Chaidez v. United States 288 involved the relatively commonplace
question of the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision. A
native of Mexico, Roselva Chaidez entered the United States in 1971 and
became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. 289 About twenty years later,
she was involved in an automobile insurance fraud scheme in which she
received less than two thousand dollars: on advice of counsel, Chaidez
pleaded guilty to mail fraud and received a sentence of probation and
restitution. 290
In 2009, Chaidez filed a naturalization petition.291 That filing brought her
criminal conviction to the attention of the U.S. government, which
instituted removal proceedings against her.292 Seeking to avoid removal
286. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1686-87. In one case, the Court granted certiorari,
vacated a court of appeals ruling, and remanded for further consideration in light of the
decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. See Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2019 (2013). For courts applying Moncrieffe’s categorical
approach, see, for example, Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 61-62 (3d Cir. 2014);
Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 754 F.3d
1105 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded on other grounds by 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). The BIA offered direction in
applying Moncrieffe’s categorical approach in In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349
(BIA 2014).
287. See supra Part I.B (analyzing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder). Importantly, the U.S.
government still has the discretion to seek to remove Moncrieffe from the United States
based on the marijuana offense. See Victor C. Romero, A Meditation on Moncrieffe: On
Marijuana, Misdemeanants, and Migration, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 32 (2014).
288. 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).
289. Id. at 1105.
290. Id. at 1105-06.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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after living in the country for more than thirty-five years, Chaidez brought
an action to set aside the conviction, claiming that her attorney never
warned her that the plea bargain and conviction might result in her removal
from the United States. 293 While that action was pending, the Supreme
Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires attorneys in criminal cases to inform noncitizen defendants of the
possible immigration consequences of guilty pleas.294
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, because her
criminal conviction had become final before the Court decided Padilla v.
Kentucky, Chaidez was not entitled to the benefit of that ruling. 295 The
Supreme Court “granted certiorari . . . to resolve a split among federal and
state courts on whether Padilla applies retroactively.” 296
Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court refused to afford
Chaidez the retroactive benefit of Padilla v. Kentucky. 297 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kagan applied generally applicable retroactivity
principles, including the Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, 298 and
concluded that the Padilla decision did not apply to cases already final
when it was decided. 299 The Court reasoned that the change in the law was
sufficiently “new” that it should not apply retroactively. 300
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reiterating the view that the
Court had incorrectly decided Padilla. 301
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. 302 Because in
her view Padilla did not announce a “new” rule, Justice Sotomayor would
have retroactively applied the decision.303
Chaidez is best understood as a run-of-the mill application of basic
retroactivity doctrine.304 The assignment of the junior Justice to write for
293. Id. at 1106.
294. See supra Part I.A.
295. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
296. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 n.2 (footnote citing cases).
297. See id.
298. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
299. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107-11.
300. See id.
301. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); supra text
accompanying notes 63-64 (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent, which Justice Thomas
joined, in Padilla v. Kentucky).
302. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114-21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
303. See id. at 1114.
304. See Austen Ishii, Note, There and Back, Now and Then: IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and
the Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949 (2014)
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the majority suggests that the case was relatively uncontroversial and that
the Court did not see itself as breaking new ground. The majority and
dissent both focused on the proper application of existing retroactivity
precedent (Teague v. Lane) to the case before the Court. 305
The holding in Chaidez v. United States that Padilla does not apply
retroactively will affect plea bargains in which convictions were entered
before the Supreme Court decided Padilla. Commentators have criticized
the Chaidez decision. 306 Because the Obama administration has made it a
priority to remove immigrants convicted of crimes from the United States
by instituting removal actions based on relatively stale criminal
convictions, 307 Chaidez is likely to affect thousands of lawful permanent
residents facing removal who will potentially suffer separation from family,
friends, employment, and community, if removed from the United States.308
Having lived in the United States for decades, Chaidez herself has three
children and two grandchildren, all U.S. citizens.309 Now facing removal
based on a minor criminal conviction that under current law was secured in
violation of the Constitution, she faces the possibility of being torn away

(contending that courts had taken an unexceptional approach to questions of retroactive
application of 1996 immigration legislation).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 297-303.
306. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless & Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in
Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez, 67
U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2013); Jennifer H. Berman, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky:
Overcoming Teague’s “Watershed” Exception to Non-Retroactivity, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
667 (2012); Petra Bondra, Note, Chaidez v. United States Erringly Resolves NonRetroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 387 (2013); Tara M. Breslawski,
Note, “But My Attorney Didn’t Tell Me I’d Be Deported!” – The Retroactivity of Padilla, 29
TOURO L. REV. 1487 (2013); Allison C. Callaghan, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case
for Retroactivity, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2012); Levi Price, Comment, Chaidez v.
United States: Breaking Old Ground, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 533 (2014).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77
308. Commentators have criticized the large number of removals of immigrants that
separate families, including families with U.S. citizen children. See Shani M. King, U.S.
Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward A Functional
Definition of Family That Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509 (2010); David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward
a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58 (2006); Marie
Weisenberger, Comment, Broken Families: A Call for Consideration of the Family of Illegal
Immigrants in U.S. Immigration Enforcement Efforts, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 495 (2011).
309. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No.
11-820), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_
court_preview/briefs/11-820_pet.authcheckdam.pdf.
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from U.S. citizen family members and the only community she really
knows.
C. Alabama v. United States: Certiorari Denial in a Federal Preemption
Case
Building on Arizona’s SB 1070, 310 the Alabama legislature in 2011
passed the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act. 311 In certain respects, the Alabama law was stricter than Arizona’s SB
1070. 312 It, for example, would have required the Alabama public schools to
collect data on the number of enrolled undocumented students. 313 This was
an apparent step toward collecting the information necessary to mount a
legal challenge to the Supreme Court’s holding in Plyler v. Doe, which
invalidated a Texas law effectively barring undocumented students from the
public schools. 314
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that federal
immigration law preempted large portions of Alabama’s immigration
enforcement law.315 The Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia dissenting
(consistent with his scathing dissent in Arizona v. United States), 316 denied
certiorari in Alabama v. United States. In doing so, the Supreme Court
310. See supra Part III.A (analyzing Arizona v. United States).
311. ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-35 (2011).
312. See William Arrocha, From Arizona’s S.B. 1070 to Georgia’s H.B. 87 and
Alabama’s H.B. 56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and Practices
of Segregation, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 245 (2012); Maria Pabón López et al., The Prospects
and Challenges of Educational Reform for Latino Undocumented Children: An Essay
Examining Alabama’s H.B. 56 and Other State Immigration Measures, 6 FIU L. REV. 231
(2011); Elizabeth M. Rieser-Murphy & Kathryn D. DeMarco, The Unintended
Consequences of Alabama’s Immigration Law on Domestic Violence Victims, 66 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1059 (2012).
313. ALA. CODE § 31-13-27 (2011), invalidated by United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d
1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
314. 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982) (stating that the record in the case failed to support the
claim of the state of Texas that undocumented immigrants burden the state’s economy and
that their exclusion from the public schools would improve the overall quality of education);
see also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the
Same As the “Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 392-96 (2012)
(explaining the adverse impacts of the Alabama immigration enforcement law on access to
education of immigrants and Latina/os generally); Kevin R. Johnson, Sweet Home Alabama?
Immigration and Civil Rights in the “New” South, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2011) (to
the same effect).
315. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2022 (2013).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/5

2015]

IMMIGRATION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 2009-13

105

declined to re-enter the fray of state immigration enforcement laws after
Arizona v. United States. 317 It instead followed the conventional practice of
allowing the Court’s recent decision on similar issues to percolate through
the lower courts. The Court’s approach shows an unwillingness to reach to
review a high profile case.
V. The 2013 Term
The 2013 Term was even slower than the previous Term with respect to
immigration merit decisions. Focusing on the text of the relevant statute and
the propriety of administrative deference, the Supreme Court’s single
immigration merits decision exemplifies the Roberts Court’s unexceptional
approach to immigration cases. 318
In the 2013 Term, the Court also denied certiorari in four cases, all but
one of which struck down the guts of a state or local immigration
enforcement law. 319 Since deciding Arizona v. United States, 320 the Court
for the time being has opted not to review any more cases that raise the
question of federal preemption of state and local immigration enforcement
laws.
A. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio: Visas for “Aged-out” Adult Children
Due in no small part to limits in the U.S. immigration laws known as the
per-country ceilings, which generally cap the number of visas that can issue
annually to citizens from any particular country, many noncitizens face
lengthy waits after filing visa applications before the U.S. government
actually issues the visas.321 The delays can be years and, in some instances,
decades for prospective immigrants and their families from nations that
annually send large numbers of immigrants to the United States, such as
Mexico, the Philippines, and India. 322

317. Alabama, 133 S. Ct. 2022.
318. See infra Part V.A.
319. See infra Part V.B.
320. See supra Part III.A.
321. See infra note 322 (citing authorities).
322. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law
and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2009) (contending that the long delays
in lawful immigration disparately impact nationals of developing nations largely populated
by people of color); Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mexico,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 713 (analyzing impacts of long lines for immigrant visas on prospective
immigrants from Mexico). The current visa backlogs are a problem that various
comprehensive immigration reform proposals promised to address, with some granting
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In 2002, Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act. 323 It amended
the Immigration and Nationality Act to establish rules for determining
answers to important practical questions caused by of the lengthy delays in
the issuance of visas to noncitizens who initially qualified for visas as
“children” but, due to the passage of time, “age out”—meaning that they
would no longer qualify as children for immigrant visas under the
immigration laws and would, therefore, no longer be eligible as derivative
beneficiaries of their parents’ visa applications.
Natives of El Salvador, Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio and her family
waited seven years for immigrant visas that would allow them to rejoin
Rosalina’s U.S. citizen mother in the United States. 324 The government
notified the family that they were next in line for visas, but they were also
informed that the applicant’s son, who had turned twenty-one while the visa
application was pending and was thus no longer a “child” for purposes of
the immigration laws, was not eligible for a visa. 325 He therefore could not
lawfully immigrate to the United States with his mother.
In an action challenging the interpretation of the statute by the BIA that
resulted in the denial of a visa to Cuellar de Osorio’s son, the district court
granted summary judgment for the U.S. government. 326 An en banc panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
statute unambiguously grants relief to aged-out derivative beneficiaries; the
court consequently found that, because the BIA’s interpretation conflicts
with the plain language of the statute, it was not entitled to deference. 327
The dissent disagreed and found that the statute “is ambiguous about
whether aged-out . . . derivative beneficiaries are within its ambit,” and,
because the BIA’s conclusion is reasonable, is entitled to deference. 328
Under the U.S. government’s interpretation of the immigration statute, a
noncitizen family member who “ages out” due to years of waiting for a visa
faces a situation in which the longer the child waits in line, the more likely
she will be removed from the line. Aged out adult children basically must
apply for a visa anew and move to the back of the immigration line. The
sufficient numbers of visas to eliminate the backlog of applications. See Julia Preston, Goal
Set for Reducing Backlog on Citizenship Applications, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A13.
323. Pub. L. No 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002).
324. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d and
remanded by Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). The visa sought is
known as a “F3” visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (2006).
325. Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010.
326. Zhang v. Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
327. Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1013-14.
328. Id. at 1021 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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U.S. government’s position denied families with aged out children the
ability to lawfully immigrate together, an outcome that runs counter to a
fundamental purpose of the U.S. immigration laws—to promote family
reunification. 329
The Supreme Court decided to resolve a circuit split on the question. 330
A bipartisan group of members of Congress, including two prominent
Republicans, Senators Orrin Hatch and John McCain, who voted for the
2002 Child Status Protection Act, submitted an amici curiae brief in support
of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute. 331
The specific question presented by Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio was
whether all noncitizens who qualify as a “child” at the time a visa petition is
filed but “age out” by the time the visa becomes available should receive a
visa at the same time as the visa applicant.332 As amended by the Child
Status Protection Act, Immigration and Nationality Act section 203(h)
provides that
[i]f the age of an alien is determined . . . to be 21 years of age or
older . . . , the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to
the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition. 333
The BIA had interpreted that language to preclude the issuance of the visa
to “aged out” children.334
329. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 7, at 262; Donald Kerwin, How Our
Immigration Laws Divide, Impoverish, and Undermine American Families, 76 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1213, 1214 (1999); see also Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”:
Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643
(2014) (analyzing the intersection of immigration law and family law in the termination of
parental rights of immigrant parents).
330. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2202, 2227 n.9 (2014) (citing
cases). Compare Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2011) (disagreeing with the Ninth
Circuit), with Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the Ninth
Circuit), abrogated by Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191.
331. See Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Mayorkas v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (No. 12-930), available
at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/12-930-bsac-Current-and-For
mer-Members-of-Congress.pdf.
332. See Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2196-97.
333. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006).
334. See In re Xiuyi Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 32 (BIA 2009). For analysis of the issues
in the case, see Dianne Milner, Note, No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth
Circuit’s Interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act in De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 46
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 683 (2013).
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Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Kagan wrote for the
plurality, in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg. 335 She
began the analysis in telling fashion:
Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets
the immigration laws. Indeed, “judicial deference to the
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context,” where decisions about a complex statutory scheme
often implicate foreign relations.336
After analyzing the statutory text—replete with jocular references to its
complexities, 337 Justice Kagan concluded that it was ambiguous and subject
to “internal tension mak[ing] possible alternative reasonable
constructions . . . .” 338 She ultimately concluded that “[t]his is the kind of
case Chevron was built for. . . . Were we to overturn the Board in that
circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert
agency’s role. We decline that path, and defer to the Board.” 339
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, unlike the plurality,
found no conflict or internal tension in the statutory provision.340 In the
Chief’s estimation, the BIA’s interpretation was consistent with the plain
meaning of the statute.341
Finding the BIA’s interpretation contrary to the statutory text and thus
not entitled to deference, Justice Alito dissented. 342
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Thomas (except as to
one footnote), also dissented “[b]ecause the Court and the BIA ignore
obvious ways in which [the statutory provision] can operate as a coherent
whole and instead choose to construe the statute as a self-contradiction that
was broken from the moment Congress wrote it.” 343
The decision in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio is the most recent
example of the Court’s unexceptional approach to immigration law. The
Court once again reviewed in conventional fashion a case squarely raising
335. See Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2195.
336. Id. at 2203 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). This last
sentence sounds of the plenary power doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
337. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203 (“Those hardy readers who have
made it this far will surely agree with the ‘complexity’ [of the statutory scheme] point.”).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 2213.
340. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
341. See id. at 2215.
342. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the question of the appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the
immigration statute.344 The Court’s decision highlights the bread-and-butter
immigration cases that the federal courts are reviewing today, with the
primary issue being whether to accept the BIA’s interpretation of the
statute. Although reasonable minds may differ about the propriety of the
outcomes of the cases, the Roberts Court is consistently applying generally
applicable legal doctrines to immigration law.
B. Certiorari Denials in Federal Preemption Cases
In the 2013 Term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in four cases in
which the court of appeals addressed the question whether federal
immigration law preempted state and local immigration enforcement laws.
In so doing, the Court more or less followed its standard practice of
declining to review cases that raised legal issues similar to those that it had
recently decided. In three of the four cases, the lower courts had invalidated
the core of the non-federal immigration enforcement laws.
1. City of Hazleton v. Lozano
In 2011, the Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded a Third
Circuit decision invalidating an aggressive Hazleton, Pennsylvania
immigration enforcement ordinance in light of its federal preemption
decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting. 345 On remand, the court of
appeals again concluded that federal immigration law preempted the
Hazleton ordinance that, among other things, prohibited the rental of
housing to, and barred the employment of, undocumented immigrants.346
Denying certiorari, the Supreme Court declined to return to the thicket of
nonfederal efforts to enforce the U.S. immigration laws. 347
2. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch
Over a number of years, Farmers Branch, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, had
enacted several iterations of an immigration enforcement ordinance that had
generated considerable controversy. 348 A sharply divided en banc court of
344. See supra Part III.E (analyzing Holder v. Gutierrez).
345. See supra Part II.C.1.
346. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
347. City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014).
348. See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local Immigration
Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 504 (2010) (noting that the
Farmers Branch city council had amended its ordinance on three occasions); Rose Cuison
Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2013) (mentioning that the
Farmers Branch ordinance prohibited housing rentals to undocumented immigrants); Daniel
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appeals invalidated the ordinance.349 Noted conservative jurist Judge Edith
Jones dissented; she would have found the ordinance a valid exercise of the
“police power” and, thus, not preempted by federal immigration law. 350 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, thereby declining to review the
Fifth Circuit decision invalidating much of the Farmers Branch
ordinance. 351
3. Arizona v. Valle del Sol, Inc.
In a piece of litigation involving provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 law
not at issue in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, 352 the Ninth Circuit in
Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting held that federal immigration law preempted
SB 1070’s effort to criminalize the harboring and transporting of
undocumented immigrants.353 The Supreme Court declined to review the
case. 354
4. Keller v. City of Fremont
In Keller v. City of Fremont, the Eighth Circuit rejected a federal
preemption challenge to much of a Fremont, Nebraska immigration
enforcement ordinance similar to the Hazelton, Pennsylvania law. 355 Passed
in 2010, the ordinance, among other things provides that landlords are
prohibited from renting housing to undocumented immigrants. 356 Even
though the court of appeals reached a different federal preemption
conclusion than the other three courts did in cases in which the Court
denied certiorari in the 2013 Term, the Court declined to review the case.357

Eduardo Guzman, Note, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances
and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 409-12 (2010) (same); see
also Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2009)
(analyzing potential violations of federal law due to discriminatory aspects of local
immigration ordinances restricting the rental of housing to undocumented immigrants).
349. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013)
(en banc).
350. See id. at 561-62 (Jones, J., dissenting).
351. City of Farmers v. Villas at Parkside Partners, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014).
352. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United
States involving challenges to other sections of SB 1070).
353. 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
354. Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014).
355. 719 F.3d 931, 951 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014).
356. See id. at 938-39.
357. See supra Parts V.B.
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****
Since the Supreme Court in 2012 struck down much of Arizona’s SB
1070 in Arizona v. United States, 358 it has refused to review a series of cases
raising the issue of federal preemption of state and local immigration
enforcement laws. For the time being, the Court appears to have said its
piece on the subject.
VI. The Roberts Court and the Erosion of Immigration Exceptionalism
A review of the Supreme Court decisions from the 2009 to the 2013
Terms reveals that the Roberts Court has consistently applied conventional
methods of statutory interpretation and doctrines of administrative
deference in its immigration decisions. Its 2014 immigration decision in
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio 359 is a clear example, with the Justices
interpreting the immigration statute differently and reaching contrasting
conclusions about the propriety of deference to the agency interpretation of
the statutory provision in question.360
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States also
exemplifies immigration unexceptionalism. 361 In an opinion generally
lacking ideological flair, the Court invalidated in large part a controversial
state immigration enforcement law that had grabbed national attention and
provoked considerable debate. 362 Indeed, in somewhat surprisingly striking
down the core of SB 1070, the Court applied standard federal preemption
principles in generally unremarkable fashion.
Immigration law thus appears to be moving away from anything akin to
the immigration exceptionalism for which it is well known 363 and is
becoming more consistent with other bodies of American jurisprudence.
Although exceptions may arise in the future in the extraordinary case,
immigration law in important respects has become what might be
characterized as “mainstreamed” in American jurisprudence.
A. The Mainstreaming of Immigration Law
In its recent immigration jurisprudence, the Roberts Court consistently
has applied generally applicable principles of statutory interpretation, rules
of deference to administrative agencies, and other legal doctrines, such as
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part V.A.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
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those involving retroactive application of changes in the law and federal
preemption. By so doing, the Court has tended toward doctrinal consistency
across substantive areas of the law.
The U.S. government continues to make aggressive arguments for the
affirmance of BIA removal orders, only to have the Court frequently reject
them. 364 The Court, for example, found unpersuasive the U.S. government’s
attempts to subject long-term lawful permanent residents to mandatory
deportation for what can be reasonably characterized as minor criminal
offenses. 365 Similarly, the Court refused to accept arbitrary and capricious
limits imposed by the Board on relief from removal for long-term lawful
permanent residents. 366 Put simply, the executive branch has invoked
zealous litigation positions to defend its aggressive removal efforts, only to
have a conservative Supreme Court, which one might assume to be
sympathetic, reject those arguments.
Once in the five Terms, a deadlocked Court could not reach a decision in
a case involving a challenge to gender distinctions in the nationality laws
that squarely implicated the continuing vitality of the plenary power
doctrine. 367 The four-four split of the Justices suggests a divide over the
constitutionality of the gender distinctions in the immigration laws. That
division, in turn, suggests that the Court might in the future revisit the
continuing vitality of the plenary power doctrine. 368
In keeping with its generally unexceptional approach to immigration, the
Roberts Court also has adhered to its standard guidelines for selecting
364. See, e.g., infra note 365 (citing authorities).
365. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013); Vartelas v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-81
(2010); see also supra Parts I.B, III.D, and IV.A (analyzing these decisions). Similarly, in
the 2015 Term, the Court rejected a removal order based on a drug paraphernalia conviction
for possession of a sock used to conceal four tablets of a prescription drug. See Mellouli v.
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
366. See, e.g., Part III.B (analyzing Judulang v. Holder and the Court’s rejection of a
BIA ruling that it found to be arbitrary and capricious).
367. See supra Part II.B (discussing Flores-Villar v. United States).
368. Similiarly, a splintered Court in 2015 did not invoke the doctrine of consular
nonreviewablity, a close cousin of the plenary power doctrine, in reviewing the denial of a
visa application by a noncitizen spouse of a U.S. citizen. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128
(2015). The Court previously rejected claims pressed by the U.S. government that judicial
review of the legal challenges of detainees in the “war on terror” were not subject to judicial
review. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796-98 (2008) (holding that detainees at
Guantánamo Bay had the constitutional right to habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 633-35 (2006) (finding that military tribunals for Guantánamo detainees violated
the Geneva Convention).
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which immigration decisions to accept for review. The Court has not
stretched the rules to grant certiorari in controversial immigration cases,
such as the California Supreme Court decision allowing undocumented
immigrants to pay in-state fees at public universities or any of the numerous
court of appeals decisions involving the constitutionality of state and local
immigration enforcement laws. 369 This caution reflects the work of a Court
carefully adhering to its ordinary rules in selecting the immigration cases to
review.
All told, the Supreme Court has applied generally applicable legal
principles to the immigration cases that it decides to accept for review. It is
noteworthy that the Court rejected the U.S. government’s arguments in a
number of immigration cases. 370 It is difficult to discern significantly
different treatment of immigration matters by the Court and any deviation
from conventional legal doctrines.
For its part, although taking aggressive positions in the high Court, the
executive branch under President Obama does not zealously invoke the
plenary power doctrine in an attempt to justify its policies in the way that
the Bush administration did with respect to the adoption of the
extraordinary “special registration” program directed at Arab and Muslim
noncitizens. 371 In fact, the Obama administration took the rare step in
Kucana v. Holder of refusing to defend a court of appeals ruling in its favor
that the courts lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen
removal proceedings. 372 Consistent with past precedent, the Court
ultimately held that motions to reopen were subject to judicial review
(although that review continues to be quite deferential). 373

369. See supra Parts II.C, IV.C, V.B.
370. See, e.g., supra Part III.B (analyzing Judulang v. Holder); Part IV.A (analyzing
Moncrieffe v. Holder).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. One exception to this rule was in the 2014
Term in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) in which the U.S. government vigorously
defended without reservation the doctrine of consular nonreviewablity, an outgrowth of the
plenary power doctrine. See Kevin R. Johnson, Argument Preview: The Doctrine of Consular
Non-Reviewability–Historical Relic or Good Law?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2015, 9:55 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/argument-preview-the-doctrine-of-consular-non-reviewa
bility-historical-relic-or-good-law/.
372. See supra Part I.C (analyzing Kucana v. Holder). The Solicitor General later made
a similar decision not to defend another court of appeal’s ruling restricting jucidial review in
a motion to reopen case. See Mata v. Lynch 135 S. Ct. 2154 (2015).
373. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (citing, inter alia, Gutierrez de Martinez
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)).
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Students of immigration law who have been well-schooled in the plenary
power doctrine may find the unexceptional nature of the Supreme Court’s
contemporary immigration decisions to be surprising. 374 The truth of the
matter is that the impact of that exceptional doctrine on the Roberts Court’s
immigration jurisprudence appears to be, at most, negligible.
It indeed is most surprising that neither the Court under Chief Justice
Roberts nor the U.S. government under the leadership of President Obama,
have paid much attention to the plenary power doctrine. Instead of
deviating from ordinary judicial review principles, the Court has
consistently reviewed the immigration decisions of the executive branch in
a manner strikingly similar to its scrutiny of the decisions of other
administrative agencies. This pattern suggests that the doctrine fits
uncomfortably in modern American jurisprudence.
Observers can draw several basic practical lessons of advocacy from the
Roberts Court’s immigration decisions. One is that the Court in the ordinary
immigration case in fact independently reviews the specific rulings of the
BIA. At times, the Court has flatly rejected the BIA’s positions. 375 Under
traditional notions of agency deference, the Roberts Court has not hesitated
to reverse removal decisions that it concludes are based on erroneous
readings of the immigration statute.376
At the same time, the Court is ready and willing, when the immigration
provision in question is ambiguous, to apply ordinary administrative law
doctrines and defer to what it determines to be reasonable interpretations of
statutory ambiguity by the BIA. 377 It, however, has not applied any form of
deference to agency immigration decisions even vaguely resembling the
blanket deference called for by an unvarnished version of the plenary power
doctrine.
Over at least the last decade, the Court has followed a consistent pattern
with respect to deference to the BIA, with a rather unextraordinary body of
immigration jurisprudence emerging as a result. That is not to suggest that
the Court’s decisions have gone uncriticized, which is not the case.
Commentators regularly question the Court’s interpretation of the laws,
374. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
375. See, e.g., supra Part III.B (analyzing the Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder,
which found the BIA’s ruling to be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and therefore
unworthy of deference); supra Part IV.A (analyzing Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v.
Holder).
376. See, e.g., id.
377. See supra Part III.E (discussing the Court’s decision in Holder v. Gutierrez); supra
Part V.A (analyzing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio).
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deference to the agency, and application of generally applicable legal
doctrines. 378 Still, the Court’s immigration jurisprudence sits firmly in the
jurisprudential mainstream, generally consistent with other bodies of
substantive law.
As is common in its approach to other bodies of law, the Roberts Court
ordinarily begins by engaging in rigorous analysis of the text of the
immigration statute.379 Immigration attorneys should take note of the
Court’s careful attention to statutory construction, which is important given
the well-known complexities of the Immigration and Nationality Act.380
Ultimately, immigration attorneys should expect ordinary—but not in
any way extreme—deference by the Supreme Court to BIA interpretations
of the immigration laws. As mentioned previously, the classic plenary
power doctrine does not appear to meaningfully influence the Court’s
review of ordinary BIA decisions. Calls for extraordinary deference rarely
come up in the run-of-the-mill removal case, in which the Court focuses on
parsing the language of the immigration laws and deciding on the
appropriate deference to the agency.
The Supreme Court has also embraced a mainstream approach in its
decisions involving federal preemption of state and local immigration
enforcement laws, which state and local governments have enacted with
regularity in recent years. 381 The Court has done so despite the volatile
political tensions over immigration enforcement and the heated controversy
surrounding state and local immigration enforcement laws. The two merits
decisions in the 2009-13 Terms deciding federal preemption of these kinds
of laws reach contrary conclusions based on a straightforward interpretation
of the statutory text of the immigration laws. 382 Those decisions clarified
the appropriate approach to federal preemption of state immigration
enforcement laws and left little doubt about, consistent with past precedent,
378. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 147-48 (citing authorities criticizing
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting); supra note 306 (citing authorities criticizing Supreme
Court’s decision in Chaidez v. United States).
379. See, e.g., supra Part I.B (analyzing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder); supra Part III.C
(analyzing Kawashima v. Holder).
380. “With only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed
‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’” Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 821 F.2d
1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)
(observing that the Immigration and Nationality Act resembles “King Mino’s labyrinth in
ancient Crete”); see, e.g., supra Part V.A (analyzing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio and the
complexities of the statutory provision in question).
381. See supra Parts II.A, Part III.A.
382. See supra Parts II.A, Part III.A.
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the primacy of federal power over immigration. Following its standard
review practice, the Court also declined to review lower court decisions
invalidating the core of the Alabama, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers
Branch, Texas (and upholding much of the Fremont, Nebraska)
immigration enforcement laws. 383
Beyond the fact that the decisions fit comfortably into the mainstream,
the Supreme Court’s body of immigration decisions is difficult to
categorize. The Court generally approaches each case on a factually and
legally specific basis and applies conventional legal norms of statutory
construction, agency deference, retroactivity analysis, and federal
preemption doctrine. The Court’s approach generally lacks ideological
heavy-handedness, with a few isolated exceptions in opinions by individual
Justices. Justice Scalia’s high-pitched dissent in Arizona v. United States
arguably represents the exception that proves the general rule.384
Immigrants generally have won more than they have lost in the Supreme
Court in the 2009-13 Terms. Such an outcome is not what one might predict
from a Court led by a conservative Chief Justice, laws that have grown
increasingly tough on immigrants 385 and the considerable deference
generally accorded to administrative agencies.386 That immigrants prevailed
so frequently might be the most surprising—and telling—characteristic of
the Roberts Court’s immigration decisions.
B. Rejection of a More Protective Immigration Jurisprudence
More than twenty years ago, 387 I criticized a series of Supreme Court
decisions that employed generally applicable principles of statutory
construction and administrative law in the review of agency immigration
decisions and found against the noncitizens.388 The thrust of the argument
was that, given the weighty life and liberty issues at stake in immigration
cases, including possible removal from the United States, the lack of direct
political accountability of administrative agencies to noncitizens who
383. See supra Parts II.C, IV.C, V.B.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
385. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 67-77 (discussing the focus of
contemporary removal efforts on immigrants convicted of crimes).
386. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 336-40 (discussing the plurality’s reliance
on Chevron deference in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio).
387. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993).
388. The four decisions were INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992); INS v.
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183
(1991); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
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cannot vote, and evidence of a consistently high incidence of error and
possible bias in the immigration bureaucracy, 389 courts should engage in
more exacting judicial review of agency immigration decisions to ensure
compliance with the law, fundamental fairness, and due consideration of the
life and liberty interests at stake.
The Supreme Court, generally speaking, has not embraced anything
resembling “hard look” review of the immigration decisions of the
executive branch. 390 Rather, it instead has consistently opted for standard
judicial review of immigration decisions similar to that generally accorded
administrative agencies. Even if disappointed by the Court’s rejection of
more exacting judicial review, scholars should view positively the
consistent individualized review of agency immigration decisions and the
application of ordinary, not exceptional, deference principles to the rulings
of the BIA.
Conclusion
A review of the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions in the 2009-13
Terms reveals that, as a practical matter, the Roberts Court’s conservative
judicial philosophy has meant review of immigration cases through
application of mainstream transsubstantive legal principles. That form of
review contrasts sharply with the judicial hands-off approach popular on the
Supreme Court in the heyday of the plenary power doctrine.391
Nor is there reason to believe that, absent unforeseeable developments,
the Court’s approach to immigration cases will change much in the near
future. The Justices seem firmly wedded to a mainstream interpretation and
application of the U.S. immigration laws.
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the Supreme Court will
continue to review immigration cases in a similar fashion. This is true even
if the Court’s ideological composition changes. More liberal appointments
might be predicted to lead to somewhat less deference to the BIA and a
further move away from immigration exceptionalism. However, increased
deference, or a revival of the plenary power doctrine, would appear much
less likely with a more liberal Court and its likely predisposition to
389. See Johnson, supra note 387, at 442-54; see also Kevin R. Johnson, A “Hard Look”
at the Executive Branch’s Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279 (arguing for “hard
look” judicial review of asylum decisions because of the life and death issues at stake).
390. One might argue that the Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, see supra Part
III.B, represents more scrutinizing, or “hard look,” review of the BIA ruling than ordinarily
given Board decisions.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
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meaningful constitutional review of the immigration laws to ensure that
agency decisions are consistent with the immigration statute.
Conversely, it seems unlikely that the addition of more conservative
Justices to the Court would result in a return to a full-fledged plenary power
regime, or anything resembling immigration exceptionalism. Additional
conservative Justices would likely result in reinforcing the current trend of
the Court’s unexceptional and unremarkable immigration jurisprudence.
However, greater deference to the immigration bureaucracy under generally
applicable administrative law doctrines might be expected.
In sum, the current trajectory of this Court’s immigration cases suggests
that, absent unexpected developments, the trend toward a normalized and
unexceptional immigration jurisprudence is likely to continue. Immigration
exceptionalism—and, with it, the Chinese Exclusion Case—after 125 years
appears to slowly but surely be on its way out.
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